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A “Neo-Abolitionist Trend” in Sub-Saharan 
Africa? Regional Anti-Trafficking Patterns and a 
Preliminary Legislative Taxonomy 
Benjamin N. Lawrance and Ruby P Andrew 
INTRODUCTION 
In the decade since the US Department of State (USDOS) instituted the 
production of its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, anti-
trafficking measures have been passed across the globe, and the US role in 
setting standards and paradigms for anti-trafficking has been extensively 
analyzed and criticized.1 Through its Office to Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking in Persons (OMCTP), the USDOS’ three-tier categorization of 
nations’ trafficking measures continues to play a pivotal role in shaming 
recalcitrant nations into responding to accusations of trafficking within and 
across their respective borders.2 
No region has experienced so dramatic a transformation with respect to 
the USDOS agenda of “prevention, protection, and prosecution” than sub-
Saharan Africa.3 No sub-Saharan African nation had an anti-trafficking 
statute at the start of the millennium. Over the course of the decade, the 
USDOS annually updated data on legislative responses and upbraided 
individual nations. By 2010, the supermajority of African nations had 
enacted new legislation to respond to the growing concern with trafficking 
in persons.4 Yet comparatively little research has examined the regional 
dimensions of this new legislative experiment and the shape it is taking. 
Although some reports present data regionally—what we shall later 
describe as part of a “horizontal” framework—scant research has attempted 
to assess the effectiveness of anti-trafficking legislation in developing 
nations on a regional basis.5 More commonly, data is presented nation-by-
nation, and analysis is generally restricted to the domestic context.6 
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While it is possible to demonstrate a relationship between a perceived 
increase in trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa and subsequent regional 
legislative responses, establishing causality between USDOS TIP directives 
and new laws is more complex. No language in the Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA) and its subsequent 
reauthorizations addresses regional variations. To the contrary, the 2003 
reauthorization reframed data collection efforts to showcase “global,” rather 
than regional, trends.7 There are those who insist the transformative vision 
embedded in new legislation is anchored by one or several domestic or 
international diplomatic agendas.8 Our interests here, however, reside less in 
identifying the policy mechanics and ideological progenitors of laws, and 
more in predicting the effectiveness and stability of the legislative paradigm 
as a remedy, as part of the wider debate on the nature of slavery and 
abolition in Africa. The precise origins of the evolving taxonomy we 
describe below remain a matter of significant debate. Thus, in order to 
predict the relative success of the implementation of the region’s new laws, 
we propose to contextualize them by situating them among earlier 
abolitionist activities affecting sub-Saharan Africa. 
For over two centuries antislavery efforts (i.e., outlawing the legal slave 
trade) and anti-trafficking strategies (i.e., combating illegal slave trading) 
have been developed in and outside of Africa through the use of legislative 
mechanisms. Scholars, however, can point to numerous examples of 
African states where multiple laws over many decades have failed to 
extinguish slavery and slavery-related practices. Focusing on specific 
nations (Mauritania, for example) only further underscores this apparent 
contradiction. On the one hand, the sequential nature of legislative remedy 
reveals how ineffective legislation may be subjected to revision and reform. 
On the other hand, practitioners of slavery and slavery-like practices seem 
able to circumvent each successive legislative remedy. This ability to 
circumvent new laws highlights slavery practitioners’ “reinventive” 
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capacity—insofar as systems of labor coercion morph into new systems of 
exploitation to evade regulation and prohibition.9  
We see the centrality of colonial and national boundaries and 
jurisdictions to studies of abolitionist activity, insofar as evidence and 
analysis is compiled nationally and presented chronologically, as an 
obstructive factor in predicting legislative efficacy.10 We describe this 
method of presentation and analysis as a “vertical” approach. Vertical 
studies ignore the “horizontal,” i.e. regional or continental-wide, processes 
associated with legislative remedies as they fan out across space and time. 
One solution is to recast the dimensions of study, and to examine legislative 
programs regionally and transnationally. We contend that what appears to 
be a new regional trend is more accurately interpreted as only the most 
recent iteration of a long-standing tradition of broad-based action that we 
identify as a “legislative trend.”11 
While our goal is to examine the broad contours of legislative action, and 
such contours are more easily identifiable after considerable time has 
elapsed since the enactment of laws, we acknowledge that each individual 
law is produced discretely and domestically. Furthermore, a focus on broad 
contours also allows us to distinguish between domestic legal products from 
bilateral, multilateral, and regional treaties and conventions, and 
memoranda pertaining to anti-trafficking. The laws that interest us are 
national products, and we have not found evidence that individual nations 
are collaborating on specific domestic legislative apparatuses. Moreover, as 
our preliminary taxonomy demonstrates, there is considerable disagreement 
among African nations with respect to how to respond to the perceived 
increased in trafficking.12 
We are writing with a set of underlying assumptions and/or observations 
that we will detail here to provide the context necessary to understand our 
argument. First, a substantial corpus of antislavery/anti-trafficking 
legislation exists, from which we identify several distinct historical trends. 
Second, we observe that previous abolitionist activities struggled with 
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defining slave systems and slave trades, much as many contemporary 
efforts have struggled to define trafficking. Third, antislavery and anti-
trafficking laws in sub-Saharan Africa from the precolonial period all the 
way into the postcolonial period created multiple categories of victims and 
perpetrators. Fourth, laws, treaties, and conventions—the antecedents of the 
contemporary neo-abolitionist agenda—created separate categories for 
adults and children and also distinguished between men and women.13 Fifth, 
subsequent antislavery and anti-trafficking laws attempted to plug the gaps 
in colonial and postcolonial legislative apparatuses and curtail the 
“reinventive” capacity of systems of labor coercion. 
We identify six general characteristics of a legislative trend and based on 
our identification of these characteristics, we hypothesize that sub-Saharan 
Africa is currently in the grip of what we term a neo-abolitionist trend. We 
argue that previous trends of antislavery and anti-trafficking legislation 
enacted over and implemented in sub-Saharan Africa provide important 
guidance in predicting the future with respect to regional anti-trafficking 
initiatives and the future of the contemporary neo-abolitionist agenda. 
Moreover, the resistance of certain sub-Saharan African nations (such as 
Niger and Botswana) to pass, implement, and enforce new legislation 
speaks to the long history of resistance by Africans to legal change 
emanating from abroad.14 
In the context of this discussion, we offer a description and interpretation 
of the emerging trends in sub-Saharan African anti-trafficking legislation. 
We examine the forms and content of the laws using examples from a broad 
spectrum of countries, and we propose a preliminary taxonomy based on the 
countries’ deployment of international models for the criminalization of 
trafficking in persons. We argue that three forms of legislative response to 
trafficking appear to be underway in sub-Saharan Africa: the first is a broad 
or “blanket” human trafficking model; the second consists of a “child-
centric” legislative model; and the third model comprises countries which 
enhance or “revalidate” existing domestic legislation and criminal codes. 
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The first group comprises states deploying laws on human trafficking 
interpreted in the broadest sense, which generically appear to meet evolving 
international minimum standards. The second group comprises states where 
laws prohibit only trafficking of minors, although the laws may accompany 
differing prohibitions depending on the relationship between trafficker and 
trafficked. The third group comprises states that appear to be resisting the 
current vogue for new law. They respond in a variety of ways, including 
amending criminal codes and labor laws, with the inference that current 
domestic legislative apparatuses provide sufficient protections for victims 
and scope for the prosecution of perpetrators.15  
In summary, Part One of this article provides a synopsis of the traditional 
“vertical” narrative of slavery and abolition in Mauritania to demonstrate 
how the “horizontal” approach we propose (i.e., a transnational and regional 
perspective) is more valuable than the vertical approach. In Part Two, we 
identify what we call the “abolitionist legislative trend.” We use this section 
to explain that we identified this trend by exploring anteceding legislative 
trends of antislavery and anti-trafficking legislation as it pertains to sub-
Saharan Africa. We also explain the defining characteristics of individual 
trends. Part Three summarizes the general characteristics of the legislative 
trend and then describes the contours of the current “neo-abolitionist” trend. 
We then examine the forms of contemporary anti-trafficking legislation 
unfolding in sub-Saharan Africa and outline a new taxonomy of state-based 
responses by focusing on domestic legislative outcomes. Based on the 
antecedent legislative trends and on the contemporary “neo-abolitionist 
legislative trend,” Part Four includes a series of predictions about anti-
trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa, and a proposal for a test hypothesis. Part 
Five offers some suggestions for more effective solutions to the problems 
presented in this article. 
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I.  A “VERTICAL” PERSPECTIVE ON SLAVERY AND ABOLITION 
Mauritania is often highlighted in press reports as a country with a deep 
and ingrained history of slavery and slave trading.16 The apparent 
attachment to slavery and slave-like institutions of the inhabitants of the 
country known today as the Islamic Republic of Mauritania is something of 
a conundrum to international humanitarians and national legislators alike.17 
Explanations of the seemingly stubborn resilience of Mauritanian slavery 
range from the ethnocentric and racialized18 prejudice,19 using proprietary,20 
class or caste21 based justifications22 on one end of the spectrum, to a crude 
form of environmental determinism on the other end.23 Accompanying these 
differing explanations are legal remedies in the form of various abolition 
measures that have been contradictorily interpreted as being simultaneously 
ineffective while at the same time contributing to the decline of slavery.24 
We propose to examine Mauritania’s history of slavery and abolition to 
demonstrate the peril of a “vertical” analytical framework bound by national 
concerns. Mauritania’s experience demonstrates that while many of the 
antislavery and anti-trafficking initiatives are domestic in origin and form, 
the practices they purport to combat are better understood as transnational 
and regional. A brief examination of Mauritania’s experience with abolition 
highlights the problems encountered by site-specific “vertical” narratives of 
slavery, trafficking and anti-trafficking. On the one hand, given that slavery 
in Mauritania has been banned on at least five, possibly more, occasions, 
with different legal pronouncements over a period of at least ninety years, 
the resilience of the institution is clearly apparent. On the other hand, 
Mauritanian slavery is frequently depicted as “dying” and/or in decline, the 
implication being that the tightening and enforcement of legal prohibitions 
will ultimately prove effective.25 Which is it? Is Mauritanian slavery so 
“secret” an institution that it will forever evade extermination?26 Or is 
slavery “slowly” dying and just needs further encouragement? 
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A.  The Case of Mauritania: Why a Vertical Approach is Analytically 
Deficient 
The history of abolition in Mauritania is instructive of perils of the 
vertical approach to analyzing trafficking and anti-trafficking. From the 
earliest records, the experience of enslavement and trafficking in the region 
challenges the site-specific narrative of slavery and abolition. By some 
calculations, between eleven and eighteen million individuals exited Africa 
across the Sahara Desert and the Red Sea from the year 650 to 1900.27  
For millennia, the region that is today Mauritania was a hinterland source 
for slaves transported north across the Sahara into the Mediterranean region. 
Africans, residing in what is now Mauritania, were traded north in to the 
Phoenician and Roman Empires and its successors. Slavery played a 
prominent role first in Islamicization and subsequently in Islamic society, 
prior to European expansion. Until the mid-nineteenth century, it was also a 
site for transportation west across the Atlantic Ocean. Slavery and slave 
trading continued to evolve as French imperial control waxed and waned. 
While coastal slave markets experienced a “slow death,” interior markets 
remained active well into the twentieth century. 
1.  Pre-Colonial Slave Trading to the Nineteenth Century 
Slavery and slave trading featured prominently in the processes of 
Islamicization, which extended south from Mediterranean North Africa 
from the ninth century over the Sahara and along the coast. Slavery was 
central to the Saharan economy and the emergence of Islamic states in what 
is now Mauritania and to its immediate neighbors. Because these trading 
routes were so valuable, the Moroccan Sultan, Moulay Ismail (1672–1727), 
raised a corps of 150,000 African slaves—his “Black Guard”—to coerce the 
region into submission.28 
Historians have documented how the rights of enslavers, enslaved and 
slave-owners were codified in Islamic law.29 Contestation over slaves was 
often the site fatwas.30 Indeed, Maliki reference manuals circulated in 
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Mauritania and provided clear definitions with respect to slavery and slave 
transactions.31  
The first African slaves brought to Portugal in 1444 came from Cape 
Branco, in what is today northern Mauritania. Between 1450 and 1500, 
approximately 80,000 slaves were taken from the region to farm 
Portuguese-held islands in the Atlantic. From Mauritania, the Portuguese 
moved their way down the western coast of Africa, establishing contact at 
the Cape of Good Hope and eastward to the Swahili coast, fomenting the 
slave trade in their wake.32  
Slavery trading, both regional and trans-continental, markedly increased 
in Mauritania in the nineteenth century.33 While the trans-Atlantic trade 
declined, slave raiding inland expanded rapidly.34 Historian Ghislaine 
Lydon has underscored the widespread and prominent social and economic 
role of slave-based transactions in the many states and communities 
occupying the area that is now Mauritania.35  
However, because much of these diverse trades were exporting schemes, 
oriented in the north and/or west, and predating the existence of the modern 
republic of Mauritania, they rarely feature in analyses of slavery within 
Mauritania today.36 This shows that a strictly state-specific “vertical” view 
ignores slave movements of this nature predating the existence of the 
modern nation, and in so doing, substantiates the mistaken notion that 
slavery today has no connection to past slave trading.37 
2.  Impact of French Empire and Colonization 
The French monarchy’s interest in slaves from the Senegal hinterland and 
Mauritanian region waxed from the mid-1600s as France took control of 
Dutch-held islands in the Caribbean. Realizing slaves were the key to the 
success of its new Caribbean holdings, the French kingdom financed the 
creation of a slave trading monopoly, the Compagnie des Indes 
Occidentales, in 1664. In 1672, the French in Senegal offered a bounty of 
ten livres per slave transported to the Indies. The success of this endeavor 
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spurred the French to charter a second monopoly in 1673. By 1679, the 
Compagnie du Sénégal had twenty-one ships servicing the ports drawing 
slaves from the Mauritanian hinterland. During the 1730s, the French 
shipped more than 100,000 slaves from its ports on the West African coast. 
The bounty for each slave increased periodically and reached 160 livres by 
1787.38 
As the trans-Atlantic slave trade began to fall into disfavor in the late 
eighteenth century, the economy and society of the region that is now 
Mauritania was again transformed. The French Republic first declared 
universal emancipation in 1794, but the declaration did not ban the traffic in 
slaves. As enforcement of the abolition proclamation proved difficult in the 
Caribbean, the reintroduction of slavery by Napoleon in 1804 was not 
particularly contentious.39  
The slave trade in what is now Senegal and Mauritania continued 
undisturbed until France’s first abolition act. In 1817, the French monarchy 
decreed the banning of the slave trade in the French Caribbean territories, 
and in 1818, formally banned French sailors from participating in the trade. 
The traders, however, responded creatively to these constraints. For 
example, they registered their ships outside France and redirected the trade 
that would have gone to the Caribbean to and from Portuguese and Spanish 
held territories, such as Brazil and Cuba. French négriers shipped 4,000 
slaves per annum in the 1820s. From 1814–1830, Guadeloupe absorbed 
38,000 slaves, Martinique 24,000, and Guiane 14,000.  
In 1830, under King Louis-Philippe, the slave trade in the four anciennes 
colonies of Senegal and its Mauritanian hinterland was again criminalized. 
Although the illicit trade continued, all the French colonies abolished 
slavery in 1848.40 Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the area that is 
today Mauritania increasingly fell under French control; and as a result, by 
the 1850s, emancipation and abolition were official imperial policy. It 
remained so as imperial authority extended south from Algeria into the 
Sahara, and west from the Four Communes of Senegal.  
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Despite a formal policy forbidding slavery, the French imperial armies 
nonetheless both liberated and enslaved communities as they extended 
control inland.41 In response, between 1856 and 1908, a French antislavery 
organization established five villages of freedom (villages de liberté) for 
those liberated from slavery in the southern part of what is now Mauritania, 
an area predominantly inhabited by black communities.42 In the face of 
opposition from traditional rulers, however, this policy was abandoned. 
Ending slavery was a core element of French colonial policy in 
Mauritania, and it involved a variety of legal and military methods.43 France 
recommitted to formally end slavery in its French colonial possessions 
when it signed the Brussels Act in 1890. Formal colonial authority over 
Mauritania began with the decree of June 16, 1895, which created the 
French West African Federation (AOF) one year after the establishment of 
the Ministry for Colonies.44 Ostensibly an entity for coordinating French 
presence in West Africa, the AOF regulated trade and the movements of 
populations.45 The AOF governed Mauritania directly from Senegal, the 
capital of the AOF, and the region’s traditional rulers were brought under 
French control.  
“Pacification,” as it was called, was a brutal process spearheaded by 
Xavier Coppolani (at least partly because of ethnic tensions at the root of 
the ongoing trans-Saharan slave trade into Ottoman-ruled northern Africa). 
Coppolani fought various groups and won concessions from others. The 
Zawiya tribes sought protection against the slave raids of Hassane warriors, 
and Coppolani formed alliances with two Qadiriyya Sufi brotherhoods, 
marabouts Shaykh Sidya Baba and Shaykh Saad Bouh. The elevated role 
accorded them in the colonial administration was exchanged for their 
religious influence over local emirs reluctant to accept French rule. Military 
threats reined in the emirates of Tagant, Trarza, and Brakna in 1903–04. But 
the northern Adrar emirate—backed by a third Qadiriyya marabout, Shaykh 
Ma al-’Aynayn and the Sultan of Morocco—was more resistant. Coppolani 
was assassinated near Adrar in 1905. The same year, the French issued a 
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decree extending the 1848 abolition to all colonies, effectively banning 
slavery throughout the AOF. Adrar was eventually defeated and forcibly 
incorporated into Mauritania in 1912, but revolts, slave raids, and 
trafficking in persons persisted.46  
While French imperial policy transformed slavery and trafficking in 
slaves internally, the external (primarily Moroccan Ottoman) demand 
continued. The region was also subject to new international agreements 
attempting to mitigate transregional traffic. After the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1919, the General Act of Berlin of 1885, and the 
Brussels Act of 1890 were reaffirmed with the Convention of Saint-
Germain-en-Laye and the 1926 League of Nations Slavery Convention. 
Signatories reasserted their “intention of securing the complete suppression 
of slavery in all its forms and of the slave trade by land and sea.”47 From 
1926, the colony of Mauritania, part of French West Africa, was subject to 
the new treaty. France continued to implement abolitionist policies and 
extend its control over Mauritania until 1939, but, as historian Ann 
McDougall observes, “the institution of domestic slavery, as distinct from 
the slave trade, remained virtually untouched by official policy.”48 
As the French incorporated Mauritania into the AOF, they encountered 
significant resistance from local communities. Mid-twentieth-century 
Mauritania remained very much a nineteenth-century decentralized society 
dominated by nomadic and semisedentary Arabo-Berber pastoralists 
(Moors), with Wolof and Tukolor sedentary farming communities located 
primarily along the Senegal River tributaries in the south. Enslaved black 
Africans and descendents of freed slaves bound by clientage to their former 
masters existed throughout all echelons of Mauritanian society. A 1904 
census report from the AOF included the term “non-free,” and listed 2 
million of 8.25 million total inhabitants as part of this category.49 French 
colonial historian, Jean Suret-Canale explained that the “term ‘non-free’ 
[was] a euphemism which the administration imposed . . . to avoid protests 
which the proper term would” provoke.50 In areas of Mauritania the rate 
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was as high as fifty percent of the local population. Several decades later the 
French governor of Mauritania observed that the colony was not yet ready 
“for mass liberation” in the model of neighboring Senegal, Guinea, and 
Gambia.51 The French feared that freed slaves would have “nothing to do 
but turn to theft and vagabondage. . . [T]he end result would be the ruin of 
the economy.”52 McDougall has argued that although the French insisted 
enforcement of abolition in Mauritania would be difficult, slavery in the 
region was “per se much the same as in other Muslim regions along the 
West African sahel-southern Sahara.”53 So despite the fact that the French 
announced a policy of abolition, they understood that Mauritanian chiefs’ 
and nobles’ slaves would “stay” with them. In this way, slavery was both 
prohibited by new law, and de facto permitted by enforcement of new law. 
3.  Post-Independence Patterns 
The conflicting forces, those for and against slavery, continued the 
struggle between new prohibitions and lax enforcement into the 
postcolonial era. The colonial policy until independence in 1960 was 
structured around the power of the “grands nomades.”54 The French insisted 
that the region was simply too large to enforce abolition; therefore, 
abolition was confined to validating the freedom of runaway slaves who 
claimed mistreatment and prohibiting the “traffic” in slaves.  
Notwithstanding this distinction between slave-holding and slave-
trafficking, stories of slaves being bought and sold, freed individuals being 
kidnapped, and slaves purchasing their freedom, abound during the colonial 
period. One such story includes a 1929 French law that formally recognized 
the right of a master to include slaves in customary inheritance settlements. 
While such judicial support for this seemingly contradictory policy 
provoked consternation among colonial officials, colonial law appeared to 
contribute to the expansion of slavery and trafficking in the region rather 
than end it.55 In fact, McDougall suggests that the percentage of the 
Mauritanian population accorded one form of slave status—haratin—
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actually rose from 2 to 50 percent from 1910 to 1950.56 Thus, although 
Mauritania took some strides in the last half-century towards eradicating 
slavery, recent social and political setbacks continue to impede its progress. 
This back and forth underscores the problem of a vertical approach to 
slavery and abolition, insofar as it fails to take into account the role 
Mauritania played in regional and continental slavery and trafficking. For 
example, Mauritania attained independence in 1960, and though abolition 
was reaffirmed in the 1961 Constitution (which incorporated the principles 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), between 1960 and 1980, 
slave trafficking and slave raids in Mauritania continued.57  
A “racialized” enslavement, of black Africans by lighter skinned Moors, 
is often highlighted as a factor contributing to the political instability of the 
region that was a site of multiple military coups d’états.58 One such coup in 
1980 brought to power a military “salvation” government. The Military 
Committee for National Salvation issued a Proclamation on July 5, 1980, 
and an executive order, number 81.234 on November 9, 1981, abolishing 
slavery. These two statutory vehicles recognized the fact that certain forms 
of slavery continued to exist in Mauritania. Furthermore, a subsequent land 
reform act in 1983 restructured tenancy and occupancy law in order to 
prohibit the serfdom normally tied to landholdings. 
Additionally, in 1984 Marc Bossuyt, of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, visited Mauritania “to study the situation 
prevailing in Mauritania with regard to slavery and the slave trade with a 
view to assessing that country’s needs in its struggle to end such 
practices.”59 Accompanied by Peter Davies of Anti-Slavery International, 
Mr. Bossuyt announced to the United Nations in 1984 that abolition had 
indeed taken effect. He recommended that the government of Mauritania 
create a specific body entrusted with the following tasks: coordination of 
the struggle against slavery to which any person experiencing difficulties in 
that field could apply; implementation of further civil status legislation 
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reform to help former slaves become conscious of their legal status as free; 
and invitations to religious authorities to explain why, in their view, 
abolition conformed with shari’a.60 
4.  2007 Slavery Act 
Notwithstanding Mr. Bossuyt’s recommendation, Amnesty International 
reported in 2002 that there was no evidence that a commission was ever 
created to compensate those subjected to slavery.61 Instead, it noted that the 
Mauritanian government flatly denied the existence of slavery and related 
human rights abuses. In September 2001, before the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, the Mauritanian government stated, “Mauritanian 
society had never known servitude, exclusion or discrimination, either in 
the pre-colonial or colonial period or since independence, and so no 
vestiges of such practices could thus persist.”62 Others have argued that 
slavery in Mauritania is essentially an economic model that requires a 
process of financial emancipation.63  
The 2003 USDOS TIP report confirmed that slavery and its related 
human rights abuses still exist in Mauritania. In a special comment the 
USDOS TIP report stated: 
The problem in Mauritania deals with reports of internal trafficking 
in persons, primarily for forced labor. Slavery was prohibited in 
1981, but some former slaves reportedly work without 
remuneration to retain access to the land they traditionally farmed. 
We have no hard data on the numbers of individuals in forced labor 
situations. Lack of economic alternatives and deeply embedded 
psychological and tribal bonds make it difficult for many 
individuals who had ancestors who were slaves to leave their 
former masters. Adult females reportedly often find it difficult to 
leave servitude because former masters may claim to be the father 
of the children and refuse to allow the children to leave. Trafficking 
of children occurs for domestic servitude and forced labor. Some 
children are trafficked to the Middle East as camel jockeys.64 
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Government representatives responded to these criticisms with the 
argument that because the 1981 statute abolished slavery, all that remained 
were its economic, social, and cultural after-effects of slavery, not slavery 
itself.  
But then, in a seeming admission of the failures of the 1980s 
emancipation, the government adopted the Act for the Suppression of 
Trafficking in Persons (Act No. 2007-048). The law criminalized the 
recruitment, transport, and transfer of persons by threat or force for sexual 
and economic exploitation. Criminal penalties included hard labor for life 
for those convicted of such crimes.65 
On September 3, 2007, the Slavery Act criminalizing and punishing 
slavery came into force. Article 2 of the Act defines slavery as “the exercise 
of all or some of the rights of property over one or more persons.”66 Article 
3 prohibits “discrimination, in any form, against a person alleged to be a 
slave.”67 According to the act, the crime of slavery occurs when “any person 
reduces another person or a person under their care or responsibility, to 
slavery or incites them to forfeit their liberty or dignity, for the purpose of 
enslaving them” and “is punishable by 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment and a 
fine of approximately US $2,000–4,000.”68 The law also codifies “offences 
of slavery,” which are punishable with prison sentences of between six 
months and two years and a fine.”69 “Offences of slavery include[:] 
appropriating goods, products or earnings resulting from the labor of a 
slave; prejudicing the physical integrity of a slave[;] or denying the child of 
a slave access to education.”70 
Like the 1981 order, the new law also provides for assistance and 
monetary compensation to those released from slavery and criminalizes 
practices such as the sexual exploitation of female slaves by their masters 
and the act of seeking to justify slavery. In addition, those who fail to 
pursue an investigation of alleged slavery, including governors, prefects, 
local chiefs, and police officers, may be liable to prison sentences and a 
fine.71 Thus, again the law was expanded to include a variety of new forms 
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of slavery, labor coercion, and trafficking, but there is little in the way of 
implementation, funding, and enforcement. 
 Despite its robust language, this new law underscores the observation 
that the antislavery and anti-trafficking laws of Mauritania, once passed, are 
never implemented. Although UN Special Rapporteur Gulnara Shahinian, 
who investigated slavery in Mauritania, commended the enactment of the 
2007 Slavery Act for providing a clear message that slavery will not be 
tolerated in Mauritania, she has since emerged as a critic of the law. In the 
four years since its passage, no case has been brought before the courts 
based on the new law. Ms. Shahinian noted that, “[t]he law addresses only 
the individual criminal liability of slaveholders; it thus relies entirely on the 
police and prosecution for its enforcement. In interviews with both 
government officials and civil society representatives, enforcement was 
raised as a problem that allows slavery to continue.”72 Despite the enormous 
public fanfare about the new law, little has changed. In 2009, the Ministry 
of Justice created a commission to review the law and provide suggestions 
on how to strengthen it, in view of the fact that no one had ever been 
prosecuted under the law. 
5.  Failure of the 2007 Act 
The 2007 law provided a mechanism whereby human rights workers 
could denounce slave-like practices;73 however, instead of prosecuting 
slavery, the Mauritanian government is now prosecuting those who 
denounce slavery.74 From contemporary accounts it appears that slavery is 
alive and well in Mauritania, and that the law is not being enforced.75 And 
even the UN Rapporteur is backpedaling on her earlier praise of the law. 
She now describes it as “too vague in its definition of slavery, as many 
master-servant dependencies—often encompassing former slavery bonds— 
fell short of inclusion in the antislavery policy.”76 
The 2010 USDOS TIP report notes that Mauritania is “a source and 
destination country for men, women, and children subjected to trafficking in 
A "Neo-Abolitionist Trend" in Sub-Saharan Africa? 615 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 2 • 2011 
persons, specifically conditions of forced labor and commercial sexual 
exploitation.”77 But the otherwise generic preamble is followed by an 
observation unique to Mauritania, insofar as the USDOS identified the 
existence of “traditional slave castes” wherein men, women, and children 
“are subjected to slavery-related practices, rooted in ancestral master-slave 
relationships,” forms of which “continue to exist in a limited fashion in both 
rural and urban settings.”78 According to the USDOS, “these individuals, 
held for generations by slave-holding families, may be forced to work 
without pay,” in a variety of occupations, including “cattle herders and 
household help.”79 And because the government “does not fully comply 
with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not 
making significant efforts to do so,” Mauritania was only one of three sub-
Saharan African nations to be accorded the 2010 TIP report’s lowest 
classification for anti-trafficking activity: Tier Three.80 
From this vertical narrative it becomes apparent that Mauritania is the site 
of repeated attempts at abolition and enforcement of anti-trafficking laws. 
Constitutional articles, decrees, orders, and acts of legislation have been 
enacted, promulgated, and pronounced with little success. But more 
importantly, the Mauritanian state’s apparent inefficacy is reified as a 
national issue and domestic cultural attachment.81 One would be forgiven 
for thinking that there is something particularly Mauritanian about slavery, 
because it is difficult to see the regional persistence of slavery and the 
regional dimensions of antislavery action without comparing the processes 
of abolition with neighboring regions. 
This vertical approach to slavery and abolition just described is 
unworkable because state-driven narratives obfuscate the fact that similar 
experiences and processes are ongoing simultaneously throughout the West 
African region. As shown above, the repeated nation-centric remedies fail to 
account for both the regional trafficking networks and flows and the 
persistence of cultural practices underpinning slave-based economies far 
beyond the national boundaries of Mauritania. Moreover, the nature of these 
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processes of abolition, and the implications of a regional and transnational 
dynamic only become apparent with a horizontal description of the types of 
abolitionist activities. Part two will show how a horizontal approach to 
slavery and abolition will be much more effective than looking at nation-
states in isolation. 
II.  THE “TREND” REVEALED: A “HORIZONTAL” APPROACH TO 
ABOLITION AND ANTI-TRAFFICKING 
The African continent has a rich history of abolition and anti-trafficking 
laws. From the era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade via early imperial 
expansion, to the mature period of colonial rule, Africa has been the site of 
important experiments in antislavery legislation. African social, political, 
and economic systems were reshaped in response to successive attempts to 
extinguish slavery and slave trades. Over the course of approximately two 
hundred years, as the slave trades and slavery were progressively abolished 
in different regions of the globe, the African continent was often among the 
first regions to experience broad abolition experiments.82 And as the many 
stages, or trends, of abolition transformed what was previously a legal 
economic activity into an illegal and illicit practice, new legislative 
responses were spawned. Each trend provides insight into the nature of 
slavery and the legal framework of abolition. 
Although the first acts of abolition were promulgated in Europe and 
North America, their focus was on the origins of the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade in Africa. Anti-trafficking efforts thus outwardly extended both 
spatially and temporally from continental Africa. An examination of the 
successive attempts to legislate abolition demonstrates the centrality of the 
region to anti-trafficking initiatives insofar as many legislative endeavors 
envisioned ending slavery on the continent. Similarly, mechanisms to 
combat evasion of new laws banning the trade that were geographically 
focused on West Africa were slowly extended to other areas. For example, 
naval patrols, freedom courts, freedom colonies, and other physical 
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realizations of legislative goals fanned out from West Africa across the 
Atlantic to the New World. 
In this context of expanding illegality, categories and identities emerged 
and were reinforced by subsequent legislation. For example, women and 
children became increasingly visible as objects of enslavement and subjects 
of antislavery legislation, because slavers actively attempted to circumvent 
controls on the slave trade.83 For example, the 1788 “Dolben’s Act” limited 
the number of slaves carried by British vessels, thus raising transportation 
costs and diminishing the incentive for slavers to ship low-value slaves such 
as children.84  
Normative practices of enslavement shifted in the context of the 
emergence and expansion of international abolitionist legal frameworks in 
the Atlantic world from the early 1800s onward. In contrast to the effect of 
the Dolben Act, historian Jelmer Vos argues that the proportion of child 
slaves grew after Britain withdrew from the trade and reached especially 
high levels during the illegal phase of trafficking in West Central Africa. At 
that time, practically one in two slaves sold in the Congo ports was under 
fifteen years old.85 Moreover, the formal colonization of Africa from the 
late nineteenth century coincided with a renewed commitment to end the 
slave trade in African colonies. Thus, nineteenth-century legislative agendas 
and enforcement strategies are important antecedents to the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century campaigns against enslavement and 
trafficking. In the following sections, we examine characteristics of five 
trends of legislative action over time that ultimately provide the backdrop 
for predictions about the efficacy of current attempts at abolition. 
A.  The Pelagic Trend: Prohibiting Oceanic Slave Trading 
The first identifiable trend began in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries as European powers contemplated abolition of the 
trans-Atlantic trade. This trend focused on Africans being removed from the 
continent. For convenience, we identify this as the pelagic trend because the 
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legislative enactments are almost exclusively focused on prohibiting cross-
ocean trade. The reconceptualization of the slave trade as slave traffic was a 
fundamental rhetorical intervention reflecting legislative and diplomatic 
initiatives that progressively eroded support for the slave trade.86 
The pelagic trend began with Denmark in 1792. Following the Danish 
Kingdom’s prohibition of the slave trade for its nationals, Britain pursued 
aggressive international diplomacy designed to compel or “shame” other 
slave trading nations into joining the prohibition on the trade.87  
The Atlantic trade operated under gradually tightening constraints 
spanning many decades from 1792 to 1867. The ban on British-flagged and 
American-flagged vessels transporting slaves came in effect in 1808. At 
about the same period, the British established Sierra Leone, and its port of 
Freetown, as its base for the first antislaving naval patrols. An 1810 treaty 
eroded the Portuguese trade and banned the slave trade in the North 
Atlantic. In 1817, a decree by Louis XVIII abolished the French trade, and 
Portugal signed a treaty with Britain conceding the “Right of Search” 
(allowing the Royal Navy to search vessels suspected of trading slaves). 
“Mixed Commissions” were established to regulate the slave trade south of 
the equator (i.e., to Brazil). Spain also signed a treaty with Britain 
abolishing the slave trade north of the equator with similar conditions and 
committed to abolishing the slave trade entirely after May 30, 1820.88 
One of the fundamental contributions of this first trend was its emphasis 
on the relationship between national legislative action and diplomatic 
pressure. It has been widely observed that the British parliament’s decision 
to withdraw from the trade was a leap of faith only made effective by the 
British government’s subsequent relentless cajoling and bullying of other 
nations to make similar commitments. 
A secondary matter, so obvious in hindsight but revolutionary at the time, 
was the decoupling of slavery from the slave trade. The decision to abandon 
the trade and force other nations to follow suit reflected a widely held belief 
among abolitionists that ending slavery and slave-based economies could 
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only be accomplished once the legal traffic ceased. This piecemeal 
abolitionist hypothesis partly explains the incremental early successes of 
abolitionists in North America, and also the stonewalling of abolitionists 
toward midcentury. For example, while the United States ended slave 
imports in 1808, it was not until 1820 that overtly abolitionist legislation 
gained traction with the passage of the Piracy Law declaring the American 
slave trade an act of piracy punishable by death.89 The abolitionist agenda 
was furthered on a state-by-state legislative basis, as members of the Union 
explored avenues to resettle former slaves in West Africa.90 
B.  The Telluric Trend: Wholesale Emancipation of Slave Populations 
The second trend of African abolition dismantled colonial and imperial 
slave systems on the ground in the Americas and Asia, and spanned circa 
1830–70. Its focus was on enslaved populations laboring in colonial 
territories, including Africans already removed from the continent. We 
name this second trend the telluric trend, because it was concerned with 
land-based slavery. This second trend primarily involved the wholesale 
emancipation of working populations who subsequently largely remained in 
situ or close proximity to their locus of enslavement. While individual 
colonial powers approached the issue of slavery on an individual basis, 
viewed historically, the existence of a trend of antislavery legislation is 
incontrovertible. 
Abolition of slavery during this telluric trend extended far beyond the 
African continent, and patterns of abolition in the West Indies were 
imported to British India. From 1833–38 the British Empire dismantled 
slavery in its colonies (but not in its protectorates or dependencies) followed 
by France in 1848.91 By the 1840s the United States and United Kingdom 
joined forces in policing the Atlantic. And throughout the 1850s the slave 
trade and indeed slavery were progressively abolished throughout Central 
and South America.92 British colonial India featured prominently in this 
second legislative trend. Henry Bartle Frere estimated a population upwards 
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of sixteen million slaves in all of India in 1841.93 The Indian Slavery Act of 
1843 abolished slavery in both Hindu and Muslim India. A revision of the 
Indian Penal Code in 1861 formally made the enslavement of human beings 
a criminal offense.94 This wholesale emancipation grappled with 
considerably greater volumes of people than the previous trend. 
Out of this second trend emerged an issue of fundamental importance for 
future abolition efforts, namely, the considerable propensity for former 
slaves to remain on or near their former slave compounds, but 
simultaneously create their own discrete domestic and laboring economies. 
This underscores a central strength of the “horizontal” approach insofar as it 
facilitates a comparative perspective with respect to emancipation over 
large regions and territories.95 Anxieties about slave departures and the 
collapse of economies had fueled proslavery activism. But the 
transformations visited on economies in postemancipation societies 
confounded both abolitionists and slavery apologists from the West Indies 
to India. Postemancipation upheavals in the Western hemisphere and India 
were fodder for subsequent policy enactments in Africa. 
Like the first trend, the legal processes of emancipation were exclusively 
domestic in origin and buttressed by diplomacy and negotiation. As ever 
more regions and modalities came under scrutiny, illegality of the slave 
trade, established via bilateral and multilateral treaties but enacted by 
domestic statute, continued to fan out across the Atlantic and Indian worlds 
over several decades continuing into the 1860s. But the stakes raised by 
wholesale emancipation were considerably higher than those pertaining to 
banning the traffic in economies where slave numbers were stable or 
increasing.  
The US affection for slavery collapsed in the violence of civil war, and 
the final abolition statutes were passed by Cuba and Brazil in 1886 and 
1888 respectively after intense domestic struggles.96 This abolition trend 
thus shows how similar processes in adjoining and nonadjoining territories 
had complementing effects. Different regions of the world drew on the 
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abolition experiences of other regions, and legislative responses built on and 
adapted those of regions that had already enacted the wholesale 
emancipation of enslaved populations. 
C.  The Imperial Trend: Extending Abolition into Africa 
The third, imperial trend of legislative abolition is situated on the African 
continent. The name, imperial, connotes the epoch and also the ideological 
motivation behind the abolition policy. The previous trends prohibited the 
removal of Africans from the continent, and subsequently the coercion of 
labor of those already removed. The imperial trend of legislative abolition 
had a new focus: on slave trading and enslavement within Africa, including 
what was sometimes referred to as domestic or African slavery, to 
distinguish it from the trans-Atlantic slave trade and plantation slavery in 
the New World. The trend is imperial because abolition went hand in hand 
with the expansion of “legitimate” commerce in Africa.97 While the 
preceding pelagic and telluric legislative trends concerned Africans 
removed from the continent, the imperial trend extended antislavery 
activities deep into the continent and its statutory basis was new and 
innovative. 
Extending antislavery legislation into the African continent was an 
important departure from the previous trends because it represented a new 
move to change political, economic, and social life within Africa. 
Beginning with the Berlin Declaration of 1885 and the Brussels Act of 
1890, European powers with African colonial interests or aspirations 
regularly and repeatedly agreed to ban the slave trade and end slavery in 
their colonial possessions.98 As they seized control of territories and moved 
military forces inland, decrees and proclamations proclaimed the end of 
slavery. Whether Nigeria or South Africa, Tanganyika or Senegal, colonial 
powers announced that their regimes would no longer enforce requests by 
slaveholders to sustain claims on coerced labor.  
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Yet while colonial powers formally abolished slavery in colonies, 
protectorates, and newly “pacified” territories, they often did little to 
enforce the legislation or decrees. European powers established special 
courts to hear freedom petitions and navigate the proliferation of claims of 
repossession by disgruntled former masters, but slave owners faced an 
uphill battle to recover labor or compensation. Slave forms persisted, as did 
slave trades, but the scale of enslavement and trade diminished from its 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century heights.99 
The imperial trend of abolition was a marked departure from earlier 
processes in several respects. It speaks to the value of a horizontal analysis 
by revealing some of the early political considerations informing a region-
wide programmatic endeavor in Africa. First, abolition featured as a 
commitment undergirding the political project of imperial expansion. 
Second, emancipation was disseminated by proclamation to territories only 
partially under imperial control, albeit via colonial officials employed by 
regimes steered by popular assemblies to varying degrees. Third, for all 
intents and purposes, emancipation was directed exclusively at Africans: 
Africans trafficking and enslaving other Africans. And fourth, the processes 
of emancipation, including tribunal hearings and freedom petitions, 
revealed the deeply gendered character of coerced labor on the continent. 
While the first three of these differences were apparent to imperial 
powers to varying degrees, the fourth came as a surprise. Women were 
central to the expansion of slavery during the nineteenth and twentieth 
century, and indigenous articulations of Islamic law shielded many 
communities from the Eurocentric legislative paradigms of abolition.100  
Moreover, the extension of abolition to the continent was not without 
other side effects. For example, somewhat paradoxically, efforts to suppress 
the slave trade in the Atlantic appear to have stimulated the trade in the 
Indian Ocean.101 Indeed, historians Gwyn Campbell and Ned Alpers and 
legal scholar, Bernard Freamon, hypothesize that the greatest expansion of 
the slave trade in the Indian Ocean occurred in the nineteenth century.102 
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These are important observations with respect to a horizontal analysis, 
because they underscore how actions in one part of Africa affect other 
regions.103 It is inadequate to explore abolition or antislavery strategies on a 
state-by-state basis. 
D.  The Colonial Trend: Expanding International Scrutiny 
The fourth, colonial, trend of abolition began in the early twentieth 
century with the 1904 and 1910 revision of the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the White Traffic, and was extended by the creation of 
the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization after World 
War I. We call it colonial because it coincided with “mature” colonial rule 
in Africa, and the language of many of its signature elements resonated with 
the paternalist overtones of classical colonial ideologies.104 The 1910 
convention was an important recognition of the highly ethnicized and 
racialized framework of previous legislative approaches to abolition insofar 
as it directed attention to a group heretofore ignored by legislators.105 The 
value of a horizontal approach to examining antislavery and anti-trafficking 
legislation is clearly visible here insofar as the legal instruments envisioned 
for anti-trafficking were regional in terms of vision. Treaties and 
conventions were not bilateral or unilateral, nor did they represent actions 
by individual colonial parties. Rather, by emerging from international 
negotiation, they paved the way for future expansive global negotiations 
resulting in the creation of anti-trafficking instruments. 
While the 1910 Convention represented a formative step in a tentative 
international regime designed to criminalize and suppress the increasingly 
organized international trafficking of white women for the sex trade, it was 
only one of a new trend of international legislative tools enacted in a variety 
of contexts. The 1910 Convention prefigured a revitalization of 
humanitarian sensibilities that informed the first trend of anti-trafficking 
legislation, but it differed insofar as it acknowledged the persistence of 
slavery and the necessity of distinguishing between legitimate migration 
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patterns and trafficking in coerced labor.106 The subsequent 1926 Slavery 
Convention of the League of Nations expanded the remit of anti-trafficking 
by wading cautiously into the previously unchartered territory of colonial 
power. 
The fourth trend built on a key innovation of the third—namely, 
internationally negotiated settlements and definitions—and it expanded the 
reach of both. While the 1890 Brussels Convention reinforced imperial 
authority with a moral obligation, the fourth trend of abolition emerged in 
the context of an explicit critique of colonial practices.107 Growing 
international revulsion about persistence of slavery and coerced labor in 
colonial Africa provoked the Council of the League of Nations to appoint, 
in 1922, a Temporary Slavery Commission to report to the League on the 
prevalence of slavery among member states and their respective territories. 
The 1924 report on slavery embarrassed member states, including many 
colonial powers.108 
One direct result of the report was a requirement by the League of 
Nations Permanent Mandates Commission that colonial mandate powers 
report regularly about the status of slavery and the slave trade and efforts at 
suppression.109 This reporting mechanism effectively exposed European 
colonies to scrutiny with respect to colonial labor practices and resulted in 
intensified policing of African workers and the workplace.110 The 1930 
Forced Labor Convention further diminished the capacity of colonial 
powers to dictate labor standards.111 While the League was notoriously 
weak and colonial states had limited capacity to broadcast power to the 
distant margins of colonies, this fourth trend of legislative action deeply 
altered the structure of labor coercion in colonial Africa.112 
A secondary issue emerging from this fourth trend was the widespread 
acknowledgement of the gender of slavery. By the 1940s, coerced labor in 
sub-Saharan Africa was comprised almost exclusively of women and 
children.113 While the imperial trend of emancipation made this apparent, 
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the colonial trend incorporated language to this effect into the text of new 
laws and treaties.114 
E.  The Postcolonial Trend: Redomesticating Anti-Trafficking 
A fifth, postcolonial, trend of anti-trafficking activity was ushered in 
following World War II and the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948). We use the phrase “postcolonial” to highlight both 
the time period of this trend (immediately upon independence) and elements 
of the anticolonial and nativist context of legislative processes in newly 
independent nations. The declaration, signed by European colonial powers 
and incorporated into many newly independent African nations’ 
constitutions, mandated universal freedom and the explicit abolition of all 
forms of slavery, servitude, and the trade in slaves. Conventions first 
extended the anti-trafficking remit of the UN beyond “white women” to all 
of womankind.115 While the second half of the twentieth century witnessed 
an increasing public awareness of the persistence of slavery, the first 
movement to acknowledge a variety of what might be collectively described 
as “unfreedoms”116 among the many newly independent African nations 
was achieved when the UN General Assembly passed the Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery in 1956.117 This convention prohibited 
“practices similar to slavery,” including debt bondage, serfdom, coerced 
marriages, and exploitation of child labor.118 
The principal characteristic of the fifth trend was the redomestication of 
the antislavery and abolitionist legislative paradigm following the models of 
the previous trends, insofar as antislavery action becomes once again a 
domestic affair. The pelagic trend enshrined the central role of domestic 
legislative action to antislavery campaigns. Whereas international 
negotiation was a key characteristic of the imperial and colonial trends, the 
fifth trend differed markedly. The colonial and imperial trends broadened 
and internationalized the definitions of “freedom” and “practices similar to 
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slavery,” because more nations were able to be part of the deliberative 
process. By contrast, with the enactment of international treaties and 
conventions as domestic legislative apparatuses, the postcolonial trend 
reified the enforcement of international mandates and human rights as an 
exclusively domestic undertaking.119 In the urgency to establish and cement 
the meaning of independence and the end of colonial rule, many African 
nations adopted distinctly defensive and even nativist attitudes to external 
criticism of the persistence within their territories of coerced labor and the 
traffic in humans.120 Thus in the postcolonial world, newly independent 
African nations chartered an anti-trafficking and abolition course that 
mirrored actions of the earlier trends. An examination of antislavery and 
anti-trafficking legislation subsequent to the domestic implementation of 
the 1956 convention reveals the value of the horizontal framework of 
analysis. 
III.  CONTEMPORARY LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TRAFFICKING IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
As demonstrated by the earlier overview of Mauritanian history, many 
analyses of antislavery and anti-trafficking initiatives fail to account for the 
relationship between national actions and convergent regional or 
transnational events. In contrast with national, vertical narratives, the macro 
analytical model puts national actions in regional and transnational context. 
And the horizontal approach also demonstrates the existence of larger-scale 
processes or trends. 
A specific legislative trend may have leaders and followers. It may 
involve pressures and incentives. Closer scrutiny of the five aforementioned 
trends would further reveal the complex processes at play, although such an 
examination is beyond the scope of this article. We offer a description of 
these trends primarily to demonstrate the value of the horizontal approach 
of larger-scale, regional analysis. Within each legislative trend, there are 
variations with respect to the specific action taken and instruments adopted. 
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As we shall see, the current “neo-abolitionist” legislative trend comprises of 
three forms of legislative responses. 
A.   General Characteristics: When Do Legislative Actions Become a 
“Legislative Trend”? 
To recap our introductory observation, as a concept, the legislative trend 
conveys the idea that a broad, seemingly collaborative program of legal 
remedy is underway, affecting multiple legal sites and jurisdictions 
simultaneously or successively. An abolitionist legislative trend (i.e., one 
focused on ending slavery or trafficking) expands beyond these core 
considerations by addressing specific issues emerging from the processes 
and practices attendant to enslavement, illicit slave movement, and the full 
spectrum of slave-like practices existing under the rubric of labor coercion. 
A legislative trend is perhaps more readily identified after some time has 
elapsed since the flourish of new legislative activity. The global wave of 
domestic violence legislation in the 1980s and early 1990s may be one 
example; another would be the surge in “children’s acts” as the international 
community enshrined in national law the mandates of the 1989 International 
Convention of the Rights of the Child. Indeed, conceived of this way, there 
are many legal topics and issues that might ostensibly be interpreted as the 
product of a legislative trend.121 
At some point individual legislative action by individual states gains the 
appearance of a concerted action. We say “appearance” because it would be 
unwise to discount the value of domestic legislative agency. At a certain 
point this appearance of a concerted action constitutes a legislative trend. 
We identify six characteristics of an abolitionist legislative trend. The 
characteristics of the legislative trend emerge from the antecedent 
experiences of antislavery and anti-trafficking activity.  
First, the mooting or promulgation of similar or consistent legislative 
apparatuses or legal processes in multiple discretely domestic locations—
nation-states, colonies, or territories—is the initial forewarning of an 
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incipient trend. Second, the emergence of a trend is situated at the dynamic 
interface between domestic, international law and nongovernmental 
activism. Third, the strength of the trend is measured by its capacity to 
harness the political, economic, and social pressures afforded by 
international diplomacy, nongovernmental activism, and the public 
performance of international negotiation. Fourth, a trend is evidenced by the 
emergence of differentiation between categories of enslavement and labor 
coercion, such as women, children, and the indentured. Fifth, the trend is 
visible when legislation appears to respond to shifting modalities of slave 
mobility, such as forced migration and human trafficking traversing 
borders, subregions, and continents. And finally, the existence of a trend is 
reinforced by evidence of a “pushback” or resistance to antislavery efforts 
by certain states and nonstate actors. 
B.  The “Neo-Abolitionist” Trend 
Sub-Saharan Africa is currently in the grip of a new contemporary 
legislative trend—a sixth, neo-abolitionist trend. We adopt the term “neo-
abolitionist” to distinguish this current trend from the previous five trends 
outlined above. Furthermore, the term draws attention to the collaborative 
role of nonstate actors (especially NGOs), in the promulgation of individual 
domestic laws. The term “neo-abolitionist” first appeared in the 1960s to 
describe the heightened activity of US civil rights advocates and their focus 
on legislative remedy.122 Subsequently, neo-abolitionist appears as a 
description of a branch of revisionist scholarship reevaluating the 
achievements of antebellum abolitionism and postbellum Reconstruction.123 
Here, the term neo-abolitionist alludes to the rhetorical interventions and 
advocacy operations of contemporary anti-child-trafficking advocacy.124 
This neo-abolitionist trend is demonstrable by factors including the 
increasing promulgations of new laws since 2000; the coordinated efforts of 
international, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental agencies and 
organizations; the appearance of new forms of diplomatic, economic, and 
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social pressures; the tailoring of legislative remedies to perceived new 
forms of enslavement and trafficking; and the resistance to the campaign for 
new laws by state, and to a lesser extent nonstate, actors. 
From 2000 to 2010, and predating the inception of the USDOS TIP 
reports, approximately fifty entirely new individual labor laws, anti-
trafficking statutes, or significant amendments have been passed by African 
legislatures. By late 2010, forty-four of fifty-one sub-Saharan African 
nations had passed new antislavery and anti-trafficking statutes.125 A 
number of states also have pending or mooted legislation revising, 
enhancing, and expanding current law. The passage of new anti-trafficking 
laws escalated quickly during the first half of the decade, then briefly 
slowed only to resume again quite recently. Chart One below demonstrates 
that 2005 was the peak year in terms of the passage of new legislation, and 
2008 was the year of the next greatest number of legislative changes.126 
Chart One: New, Draft, or Amended Laws, Bills, and Codes Pertaining 
to Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000–2010127 
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1. The First Statutes 
The contemporary neo-abolitionist legislative trend appears to begin in 
2000 with the passage of Malawi’s Employment Act, Act No. 6 of 2000 
(Malawi Act). This act was the first significant legal intervention in forced 
labor in sub-Saharan Africa in almost two decades. Prior to 2000, very few 
African nations had attempted to pass legislation pertaining to coerced labor 
or the forced or illicit movement of individuals for exploitative labor 
purposes. The only two significant new legislative tools worthy of note—
Mauritania’s aforementioned decree banning slavery and subsequent 
statute, and Cote d’Ivoire’s Penal Code revisions—date from the early 
1980s.128  
Malawi’s 2000 legislation is important because it demonstrates the first 
legislative response to an increasing international interest in human 
trafficking and labor exploitation, although the Malawi Act predates the TIP 
reports. Part II, Section 4 of the Malawi Act described two fundamental 
principles, whereby “no person shall be required to perform forced labour,” 
and any “person who exacts or imposes forced labour or causes or permits 
forced labour shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of K 10,000 
and to imprisonment for two years.”129 Moreover, combined with a revision 
of the penal code, the Malawi Act provided for an effective anti-trafficking 
response. The 2010 USDOS TIP report noted that “though the country lacks 
specific anti-trafficking laws,” Malawi remained in good standing because 
it “prohibits all forms of trafficking through various laws.”130 And as we 
shall see, Malawi continued to resist pressure for a new law until the 
passage of the 2010 Child Care, Protection and Justice Act. 
Statutes pertaining to labor and coercion continued to percolate through 
legislative assemblies and executive committees for the first several years 
of the new millennium, although they were at first few in number. After 
Malawi’s Employment Act, Eritrea’s Proclamation No. 118/2001 became 
the next important milestone. This proclamation defined forced labor as 
“any service which a person performed involuntarily due to the coercion of 
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another person,” and highlighted mechanisms of coercion, including “any 
work performed involuntarily merely because of someone’s influence as a 
result of his holding a public office or traditional status of chieftaincy.”131 
Coupled with penalties described in the penal code, Eritrea took an early 
stance on labor coercion, if not specifically on trafficking for labor 
purposes.132 But where Malawi’s resistance to a specific human trafficking 
law was bolstered by demonstrable enforcement of existing statutes, the 
2010 USDOS TIP report notes that in spite of establishing these and other 
constitutional and statutory tools, Eritrea “has never used these statutes to 
prosecute cases of human trafficking.”133 
The appearance of statutes and other prosecutorial mechanisms with 
specific language directly pertaining to trafficking began in 2002 with the 
revision of Mali’s Code Pénal. The February 2002 revision was noticed by 
the USDOS’ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 
(OMCTP), which commented in its 2002 TIP report that while Mali “does 
not yet fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of 
trafficking . . . , it is making significant efforts to do so.”134 Article 244 of 
Mali’s code extended the existing definition of illegal contracts that 
deprived an individual of liberty to children. By defining trafficking as “the 
collective process by which a child is moved or removed internally or 
externally from the country in such a condition that s/he is transformed into 
a chattel (transforment en valeur marchande) by one or more of the 
individuals involved, regardless of the final point of removal of the 
child.”135 The substantive definition is expanded to include “any act 
involving the recruitment, transportation, concealment, or the true identity 
(la vérité) of a child,” and “any act leading to” the removal of a child 
internally or externally.136 Punishment for a violation of article 244 is five 
to twenty years in prison, which the USDOS observed in 2010 to be 
“sufficiently stringent and comparable with penalties for sexual assault.”137 
Notwithstanding this observation, the 2009 demotion of Mali to the Tier 
Two Watch List indicates that Mali’s government remains under 
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considerable pressure from international NGOs and the US government to 
adopt comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation.138 
2. First Indications of Emerging Distinctions in Legislative Responses 
By 2003, the passage of two entirely new laws devoted to human 
trafficking explicitly put anti-trafficking law on the legislative radar in sub-
Saharan Africa. Furthermore, 2003 also provided the first instance of a 
divergence in legislative response between “child-centric” and “blanket” 
approaches to all forms of trafficking. For example, Burkina Faso and 
Nigeria passed laws in May and July respectively. Burkina Faso’s Loi No. 
038-2003/AN, “portant la défintion et la répression du trafic d’enfant(s),” 
adopted on May 27, 2003, defined a child trafficker as “any person who, 
independently or in an organized associative capacity, accompanies, incites, 
facilitates the movement (le déplacement), transit, or stay or housing (le 
séjour) of children,” pursuant to the description of trafficking.139 The 
expansive definition of child trafficking included, “any act whereby a child 
is recruited, transported, transferred, hous[ed] or welcomed internally or 
externally of the country.”140 Punishments included imprisonment up to five 
years and a fine up to 1.5 million FCFA.141 
By contrast, Nigeria’s Act 23 of 2003 created a National Agency for 
Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP). In 
so doing, Nigeria elevated human trafficking beyond Burkina Faso’s simple 
extension of criminal law to an entirely new administrative level. In 
creating NAPTIP, Article 4 of the Nigerian law delegated to an agency the 
power of “co-ordination of all laws on traffic in persons and related 
offences and the enforcement of those laws,” and the responsibility for the 
“adoption of measures to increase the effectiveness of eradication of traffic 
in persons.” The text of Act 23 provides expansive categories for anti-
trafficking enforcement. The definitions of “trafficking” and “trafficked 
person” are consistent with evolving international definitions.142 
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Interestingly, Nigeria is also the first sub-Saharan anti-trafficking law to 
simultaneously deploy the language of slavery, stating:  
Any person who imports, exports, removes, buys, sells, disposes, 
traffics or deals in any person as a slave or accepts, receives, or 
detains a person against that person’s will as a slave, commits an 
offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life.143  
Nigeria’s northern neighbor, Niger, however, elected simply to amend 
Article 270 of its penal code to prohibit slavery.144 
The fundamental divergence into three legislative responses, to which we 
will shortly turn our attention, dates to the actions of Mali, Nigeria, Niger, 
and Burkina Faso. The divergence intensified over the next several years, 
with small but instructive shifts. In 2004, Namibia and Equatorial Guinea 
followed Nigeria and passed laws incorporating language pertaining to 
human trafficking.145 Namibia incorporated human trafficking within its 
Prevention of Organized Crime Act, No. 29, and is the first law to also 
include human organ trafficking.146 Equatorial Guinea melded smuggling 
with trafficking in the publication in the Boletín Oficial of the Law on the 
Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons. Lesotho followed 
Burkina Faso’s lead by adopting the Children’s Welfare and Protection Bill, 
which described child trafficking as  
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, sale, harbouring or receipt 
of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving 
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation.147  
Gabon also passed a child trafficking law.148 Ethiopia, for its part, mirrored 
Malian conservatism by revising its criminal code to include language 
pertinent to child trafficking.149 
The peak year of the decade long legislative trend was 2005 during which 
at least twelve new anti-trafficking statutes were promulgated.150 The 
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influence of the trafficking definitions standardized in the Palermo 
Protocols of 2000 is much clearer in the slew of new laws among those 
following Nigeria’s lead. Sierra Leone’s Act No. 7, the Anti-Human 
Trafficking Act, adopts the language of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, almost 
verbatim.151 The definition of trafficking in Liberia’s Act to Ban Trafficking 
in Persons Within the Republic of Liberia mirrors its neighbors’ acts.152 By 
contrast, Senegal’s Loi n° 2005-06 “Relative à la lutte contre la Traite des 
personnes et Pratiques assimilées et à la Protection des victims,” contained 
no definition of trafficking at all. Among those nations adopting a child-
centric approach, Cameroon’s Loi n° 2005/015 du 29 décembre 2005 
“relative à la lutte contre le trafic et la traite des enfants” incorporated a 
definition very similar to Burkina Faso. Mauritius and South Africa passed 
child protection acts incorporating terminology on child trafficking. Several 
other nations continued processes of revising existing criminal codes and 
labor laws, a path that indicates a strong disinclination to embrace the 
necessity for new law. Moreover, the new laws of 2005 demonstrate that 
child-centric, blanket, and revalidation approaches are not confined to one 
region or community of nations with a common colonial history or 
language. 
From 2006 until 2010 we estimate at least twenty-four new laws or legal 
code revisions were undertaken by sub-Saharan nations.153 Every part of 
sub-Saharan Africa was swept up in the clamor for new law. Countries with 
vastly different legal traditions and European colonial legal heritage—from 
Djibouti to Kenya and Mozambique—found common cause in and common 
pressure to pass anti-trafficking laws.154 By 2010, a supermajority of forty-
five sub-Saharan African nations had provided some capacity of anti-
trafficking statutory protection. While several new laws are still in the 
pipeline, a considerable drop off in 2011 is assured by the simple fact that 
most African nations appear to have now met minimum USDOS 
requirements.155 Indeed, there is evidence emerging that a new stage is 
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unfolding in the neo-abolitionist trend, namely the revision and/or 
enhancement of new laws: Burkina Faso, South Africa, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
and others have passed or announced, updated or expanded laws.156 Some, 
such as Ghana, amended laws after finding them ineffective or 
unenforceable.157 
C.  A Preliminary Taxonomy of Anti-Trafficking Laws in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
By 2010, the overwhelming majority of sub-Saharan African nations 
responded to the legislative challenge of the USDOS OMCTP. These 
responses fall into one of four categories. In the first group, the blanket 
human trafficking model, there exist laws such as that of Ghana, 
Mozambique, and South Africa, which established a wide legislative tool to 
encompass all forms of trafficking, including adults and organ theft. In the 
second group, the child-centric model, laws such as those of Togo, Benin, 
and Lesotho focus on children exclusively. In the third group, the 
revalidation model, we place countries such as Angola, Botswana, and 
Mali, which maintain they can combat trafficking through revisions of 
existing criminal codes and/or enhancements of existing legislative 
instruments. The fourth group comprises those nations who have taken no 
action, or for which there is no data. 
The following two data sets, Chart Two and Table One, demonstrate 
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Chart Two: Placement, by Group, of Sub-Saharan African Nations in a 
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Table One: Placement, by Country, of Sub-Saharan African Nations in 







Model No Change/ No Data 
Burundi Benin Angola Cape Verde 
Burkina Faso Cameroon Botswana Comoros 
Djibouti Congo Republic 
Central African 
Republic Sao Tome e Principe 
Equatorial Guinea DR Congo Chad Seychelles 
Gambia Ethiopia Cote d’Ivoire Somalia 
Ghana Gabon Guinea-Bissau Western Sahara 
Kenya Guinea Eritrea Zimbabwe 
Liberia Lesotho (Northern) Sudan n=7 
Mauritius Malawi Mali  
Mauritania (Southern) Sudan  Niger  
Mozambique n=10 n=10  
Namibia    
Nigeria    
Rwanda    
Senegal    
Sierra Leone    
South Africa (draft)    
Swaziland    
Tanzania    
Uganda    
Zambia    
n=21    
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1. The “Blanket” Approach: Human Trafficking Laws 
The first legislative model, the blanket approach, situates child trafficking 
within wider clandestine networks of human trafficking. The laws in this 
group, while addressing trafficking of both adults and children, frame the 
role of parents in complex and, at times, conflicting ways. Ghana’s Human 
Trafficking Act (Act 694) of 2005, Mozambique’s Lei No.6/2008, and 
South Africa’s draft 2010 Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in 
Persons Bill (B7-2010) are representative of this group of legislation. Each 
span several years of new human trafficking law in varied locales, 
demonstrates legislative innovation and the expanding interests of 
legislators, and addresses many regional concerns. 
The blanket category currently holds the largest membership, and 
continues to expand. The newest additions are South Africa and Kenya. 
This approach – also embodied in laws from Nigeria (2003), Djibouti 
(2007), and Mauritius (2009) – has produced some surprising results. On 
the one hand, the blanket approach groups together all forms of 
trafficking—child, adult, and other (e.g., organ theft)—for the purposes of 
prosecutorial attention, and thus streamlines funding.158 On the other hand, 
the lack of specific focus on children as trafficking subjects results in legal 
inconsistencies. For example, Nigeria’s Child Rights Act (2003) 
criminalizes child trafficking in only twenty of the thirty-six states where 
the act is operative.159 Furthermore, states with blanket approaches devote 
significant enforcement support to aspects of trafficking, such as 
prostitution, that are unrepresented in the child victim pool. Such support is 
developed in compliance with foreign governmental initiatives to repatriate 
smuggled “illegal” migrants from, for example, the European Union and the 
United States.160 
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a. Ghana 
The 2005 Ghana law elaborates a series of broadly applicable definitions 
pertaining to trafficking, which incorporates the parental role. Initially, 
human trafficking is defined as, 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, trading or 
receipt of persons within and across national borders by (a) the use 
of threats, force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud or 
deception, the abuse of power or exploitation of vulnerability, or 
(b) giving or receiving payments and benefits to achieve 
consent.161 
Exploitation is further defined as including, “at the minimum, induced 
prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, 
slavery and practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs.”162 Trafficking is then framed to include “placement for sale, 
bonded placement, placement as service where exploitation by someone 
else is the motivating factor.”163 Finally, children are not mentioned until 
Clause one, Section 4, which articulates that: 
Where children are trafficked, the consent of the child, parents or 
guardian of the child cannot be used as a defense in prosecution 
under this Act, regardless of whether or not there is evidence of 
abuse of power, fraud or deception on the part of the trafficker or 
whether the vulnerability of the child was taken advantage of. 
Thus, the actus reus undergirding the Ghanaian prohibition on trafficking 
is constituted in multiple ways. This includes the specific criminalization of 
all behavior iterated in Article One.164 Such individuals are subject to no 
less than five years imprisonment.165 
Whereas the definition of trafficking includes the issue of coercion by 
parents, Clause 3, Section 1, restates the fact that simply being a parent of 
the trafficked victim does not preclude prosecution: “A person who 
provides another person for purposes of trafficking commits an offence 
even where the person is a parent.”166 The law subsequently expands 
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prosecutable parties to include accessories to trafficking, which are defined 
as “intermediaries.”167 An intermediary is “someone who participates in or 
is concerned with any aspect of trafficking” under the Act “who may or 
may not be known to the family of the trafficked person.”168 The phrase “is 
concerned” is expanded to include “to send, take to, consent to the taking to 
or to receive at any place any person” and “to enter into an agreement 
whether written or oral” that results in trafficking.169 Anyone “who uses” a 
trafficking victim is subject to the same punishment.170 Moreover, the 
Ghana Act tenders an extraterritorial jurisdiction to all acts that “would 
have constituted the offence of trafficking.”171 Notwithstanding the defined 
punishments, a judge is permitted to take special circumstances into 
consideration when determining sentences, presumably including, for 
example, a possible kinship relation between victim and perpetrator.172 
Reporting mechanisms further transcend the child/parental divide. It is 
the duty of all Ghanaians to “inform the police” of incidents of 
trafficking.173 Reporting to police “or other security services” may take 
place where the offender or victim lives, where the trafficking occurred, or 
where the victim is temporarily located.174 Child victims of trafficking too 
may report, with assistance from friends.175 Knowledge of trafficking may 
also be passed on to a number of government agents and agencies, including 
“reputable” NGOs.176 A further series of articles explains the processes 
whereby trafficked persons are to be rescued, cared for temporarily, 
counseled, and their families traced.177 The law specifically mandates that 
“the views of the trafficked person shall be taken into consideration,” and 
“rehabilitation” and related matters are all to be done “in the best interests 
of the child.”178 A 2006 amendment to the 2005 Act corrected an error with 
respect to the definition of exploitation that had rendered the original act 
unenforceable.179 
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b. Mozambique 
Where Ghana featured a parent-child distinction in its act, Mozambique’s 
law focuses on an inclusion of women. Mozambique’s Lei No.6/2008 is 
entitled a comprehensive human trafficking act, and the language employed 
embraces the Palermo Protocols’ emphasis on the vulnerability of women 
and children. While the definition of the criminal act of trafficking (but not 
the punishment to accompany it) in Article 10 conforms to some evolving 
standards in international law, the act of trafficking is separated from the 
conveyance and transportation of victims, which appears in Article 13.180 
Article 2 of the law describes its objective as “the establishment of a 
juridical regime applicable to the prevention and combating of trafficking in 
persons, and in particular women and children.” Article 5 describes a series 
of “aggravating circumstances” whereby additional penalties are incurred, 
including but not limited to, trafficking actions affecting children, women, 
and individuals under eighteen years of age. Additional aggravating 
circumstances include the perpetrator being an educator, religious official, 
or state or public official. 
Further distinguishing it from Ghana’s law, Mozambique’s places 
particular emphasis on the contexts whereby trafficking of and exploitation 
of children may originate within the wider context of human trafficking. For 
example, Article 12 outlaws the adoption of children when the outcome is 
child prostitution, and Article 11 adds language about pornography and 
sexual exploitation that does not feature in many human trafficking laws. It 
also criminalizes a variety of issues pertinent to trafficking, but rarely 
addressed in trafficking laws, including the seizure and destruction of travel 
documents of victims by traffickers.181 Article 24 provides for the 
permanent residency of trafficking victims who aid in the prosecution of 
traffickers. Perhaps the most innovative element in the law is Article 15 
concerning the “publicity and promotion of trafficking,” whereby anyone 
disseminating materials or advertizing the trafficking of individuals by any 
means, including “the internet” (incluindo o uso de tecnologia de 
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informação e a internet [emphasis in original]), is subject to criminal 
sanction and possible imprisonment. Trafficking actions by relatives of any 
degree (por parente de qualquer grau na linha recta), blood relations, and 
anyone entrusted with the role of guardian for a minor, are singled out for 
particular attention.182 Article 8 makes reporting any trafficking actions the 
responsibility of all citizens. 
c. South Africa  
South Africa’s draft bill describes trafficking and anti-trafficking action 
with greater precision vis-à-vis the criminal justice system.183 We include a 
draft because South Africa plays a prominent role in anti-trafficking, and 
the content of the bill is still under scrutiny and subject to revision. The 
definition of trafficking adopted is verbatim to that which appears in the 
Palermo Protocols.184 In contrast with Ghana, South Africa’s law of 2010 
specifically refers to the international obligations entered into when the 
state became a signatory to the Palermo Protocols.185 
With the likely imminent passage of the bill, South Africa will move 
from a child-centric to a blanket approach. This shift is clearest with respect 
to parental responsibility for trafficking of children in Chapter 9, Clause 34, 
entitled, “Trafficking of child by parent, guardian or other person who has 
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of child,” which discusses the 
parental role clearly. 
34. (1) If a children’s court has reason to believe that the parent or 
guardian of a child or any other person who has parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of a child, has trafficked the 
child, the court may—(a) suspend all the parental responsibilities 
and rights of that parent, guardian or other person; and (b) place 
that child in temporary safe care, pending an inquiry by a 
children’s court. (2) Any action taken by a children’s court in 
terms of subsection (1) does not exclude a person’s liability for 
committing the offence of trafficking in persons . . . .186 
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The law also contains an elucidation of the purpose of the clause, under 
definitions. The purpose of clause 34 is explained as follows: 
if a children’s court has reason to believe that a parent or guardian 
of a child or any other person who has parental responsibilities and 
rights in respect of a child has trafficked the child, the court may 
suspend such rights and responsibilities and place the child in 
temporary safe care, pending a children’s court inquiry. This, 
however, does not exclude that person’s liability for committing 
the offence of trafficking in persons.187 
A 2008 magistrate’s decision suggests that until 2010, the law with 
regard to parental responsibility was unclear.188 However, Clause 34 is 
identical to Chapter 18, Clause 287 of the 2005 South African Children’s 
Act, except insofar as the entire matter is from its initial prosecution the 
remit of a Children’s Court.189 
2.  The Child-Centric Approach: Restricting Criminality to Acts 
Perpetrated Against Minors 
The second legislative model, a “child-centric” law, prevails in ten 
nations, and the laws of Togo, Benin, and Lesotho are broadly emblematic, 
because the laws either focus exclusively on child trafficking (Togo and 
Benin) or implement domestic reforms required by international obligations 
emanating from the ratification of the International Convention of the 
Rights of the Child (Lesotho). As shown above in Chart Two and Table 
One, Gabon and Cameroon are included in this group because their 
prohibitions specifically on child trafficking and slavery, in 2004 and 2005 
respectively, were complemented by the expansion of existing criminal 
codes.190 This narrower approach delinks children from adult trafficking 
networks with a variety of consequences. By 2010 each state in this second 
child-centric group reported investigations and prosecutions, so there is 
little ground to believe the laws were ineffective. 
Our preliminary analysis of laws in this group suggests that this may 
accurately be described as a transitional stage. The child-centric group 
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currently is comprised primarily of francophone countries because many 
anglophone and fewer francophone countries expanded their initial child-
centric laws to encompass a blanket approach.191 For example, Gambia and 
South Africa previously passed laws on children’s rights in 2005, which 
enshrined the International Convention on the Rights of the Children into 
domestic law, and included provisions prohibiting trafficking. Yet by way 
of a 2007 law in Gambia and a 2010 draft bill in South Africa, the law 
expanded to include all forms of human trafficking; and, at least in South 
Africa’s draft law, the language employed was more or less identical to the 
2005 text. 
a. Togo 
The 2005 Togo law “with respect to the traffic in children in Togo,” is 
divided into five chapters covering generalities, definitions, prevention, 
penalties, and miscellany.192 Perhaps, because the law is not concerned with 
other forms of trafficking, the text is brief.193 The law is specifically defined 
to address only trafficking in children, and the purpose of the law is 
explained as “the definition, prevention and suppression of the trade in 
children in Togo.”194 
The law in Togo defines trafficking in children by focusing on the age of 
the individual, the process of movement or displacement, and the type of 
exploitation. Following emerging international standards, a child is defined 
as one younger than eighteen years old.195 Trafficking in children is viewed 
as “a serious infraction” which is defined “as the process whereby a child is 
recruited or kidnapped, transported, transferred, housed or accommodated,” 
within the interior of the country or externally to the national territory, “by 
one or more people with the purpose of exploitation.”196 Exploitation in turn 
is defined as “all activities which provide to the child no economic, moral, 
mental or physical benefit but which by contrast, deliver to the trafficker or 
other individuals, either directly or indirectly, economic, moral or physical 
benefits.”197 The trafficker (auteur du trafic) is described as “any individual 
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who performs at least one of the acts enumerated” in the previous article.198 
A further provision elaborates a series of individuals who are considered 
accomplices to the offences, including those who provide “information or 
instructions”; those who procure “tools, weapons, transport or other means” 
to support, aid, or abet traffickers; and, those who assist in the preparation, 
facilitation or consumption of the criminal acts of trafficking.199 
The 2005 law mandates both general and specific responsibilities for the 
state with respect to the prevention of trafficking.200 The final article of the 
section on protection lays out the mechanism whereby a child, 
unaccompanied by parent(s) or guardian(s), may be permitted to leave the 
country; it provides for a special authorization, the details of which are to be 
elaborated by the Council of Ministers.201 The 2005 law also says that all 
“measures adopted must guarantee the superior interests of the child and 
respect his/her dignity.”202 
The largest chapter of the law defines “sanctions” or punishments. 
Traffickers and their accomplices, as well as those attempting to traffic, are 
subject to prison sentences of between two and five years, and/or a fine 
between one and five million francs, “regardless of the point of departure or 
destination of the children.”203 A series of enhancements resulting in 
imprisonment of five to ten years, and a fine of five million to ten million 
francs, exist in certain circumstances, including: 
1. If the child is below the age of fifteen at the time of the crime; 
2. If the act committed is accompanied by violence; 
3. If the trafficker uses drugs (stupéfiant) that affect the capacity of the 
victim; 
4. If the trafficker uses weapons or carries a conceal weapon; 
5. If the victim is hidden or displayed in a public or private place; 
6. If the act of trafficking causes the child physical, mental, or moral 
damage or other repercussions requiring medical attention; 
7. If the trafficking is part of an organized or group activity; 
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8. If the child is subjected to the worst forms of labor; 
9. In the event that the trafficker is a recidivist.204 
Parents are subject to lesser punishments (six months to a year in prison 
or probation up to three years) if they knowingly facilitate the trafficking of 
their child or one under their guardianship.205 
b. Benin 
The 2006 Benin law, subtitled a law “with respect to the conditions 
whereby children are moved, and for the suppression of the trade in 
children,” has as its “object” the “determination of the conditions under 
which children are moved and the elimination of the traffic in children” 
within the republic.206 The law is divided into four chapters: generalities and 
definitions, a description of the conditions under which children are 
trafficked within Benin and beyond its borders, administrative and penal 
disposition, and miscellany. The text of the first chapter precisely defines 
what constitutes child trafficking by detailing several key factors present in 
child trafficking. For example, it defines “children” as those under eighteen 
years old.207 A “trafficker” is defined as an individual performing an act for 
the purpose of alienating “the liberty or person of a child, whether 
gratuitously or for personal financial gain.”208 Such acts of alienation may 
include the recruitment, transportation, transfer, placement, or harboring of 
children, “regardless of the ultimate particularities of the method of 
exploitation.”209 
The concept of “exploitation” in the 2006 Benin law is further elaborated 
to include, but is not limited to: 
 all forms of slavery or analogous practices, debt bondage, and 
servitude such as forced labor, the use of children in armed 
conflict, or for the purposes of organ transplant; 
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 the offering up or procurement of a child for the purposes of 
prostitution and the production of pornographic materials and 
films; 
 the offering up or procurement of a child for the purpose of 
criminal activities; 
 any work, which by its nature and/or conditions, may endanger 
the health, security, or morality of a child or delivering a child 
into any such circumstances.210 
The concluding articles of the opening section state unequivocally that 
child trafficking and all forms of child labor are illegal in Benin, except for 
those permitted under international law.211 
An important section of the law describes several contexts in which child 
trafficking operates. This section includes: the types of acts whereby a child 
would be considered trafficked within and outside the country, the forms of 
movement of a child within the country, and the unauthorized separation of 
a child from a biological parent (or a person with designated “authority”).212 
This special authorization must be “delivered by the competent 
administrative authority in the child’s place of residence.”213 The law also 
states that no one is permitted to receive a child without assurance that such 
an authorization exists.214 Further, anyone other than the biological parents 
who receives a child must report the child’s arrival within seventy-two 
hours, and is subject to penalties described in the same law. With the 
exception of war and natural disaster, no foreign child may enter Benin 
unless accompanied by a biological parent or a guardian. Additionally, the 
child must be in possession of an identity document and documentation 
about the destination and purpose of the voyage.215 Restrictions on the 
movement of Beninese children beyond the limits of the republic are similar 
to entry constraints. Any parent or guardian seeking to remove a child must 
be in possession of a dossier consisting of the place of origin, the 
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destination, the purpose of the movement, and the identity of the individuals 
or establishment that will receive the child.216 
Like Togo’s, Benin’s law also foregrounds prosecution and punishment. 
Any child found in a situation that violates the terms laid out above (as a 
result of the action—à l’insu—of parent of guardian) may be returned to his 
or her parents or an institution of protection.217 Anyone found to be, 
“moving, attempting to move, or accompanying,” a child without the 
appropriate identifying documents, regardless of destination, is subject to 
punishment if it can be “established that the child is a victim of trafficking 
and the transporter took the child deliberately.”218 The law is exceptionally 
tough on coercion by parents: mothers or fathers who knowingly relinquish 
their child into the custody of a “trafficker” can face between six months 
and five years imprisonment.219 Any individual involved in the domestic 
movement or “attempted” movement of a child who has not followed the 
protocols stipulated by the law faces between one and three years 
imprisonment and a fine between 50,000 and 500,000 CFA.220 Similarly, 
individuals, regardless of nationality, involved in removing a child from the 
territory of the republic are subject to a sentence of two to five years and a 
fine of 500,000 to 2,500,000 CFA.221 Furthermore, anyone failing to convey 
knowledge of the trafficking of a child is also punishable by a fine.222 The 
law makes a crucial distinction, however, between those who, “move or 
attempt to move,” and those who “deliver into the trade” a child, whereby 
the latter face between ten and twenty years imprisonment.223 
Benin’s law then reiterates a series of circumstances that result in a 
sentencing enhancement, often life behind bars.224 These circumstances 
include that “if the child is not recovered prior to sentencing or is recovered 
deceased”225 a sentencing enhancement will be added. Recidivism results in 
the doubling of the punishments reiterated in articles 16–21.226 Additional 
criminalized activities include knowingly “employing” a child who 
originated in the trade, threats or use of force, “other forms of constraint,” 
abduction, fraud, deception, and “abuse of authority.”227 Other acts 
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constituting aggravation of child trafficking include: violence, deprivation, 
incitement to debauchery or mendacity, public indecency, offering or 
accepting payment or benefits, or consent to exploit a child.228 To 
underscore the severity of the proscriptions, Articles 26 and 27 state: first, 
“the attempt to commit any of the infractions previewed in the present law 
is subject to the same punishment as if the crime were committed,” and, 
second, “accomplices” will be punished in the same way as “authors” of the 
criminal acts.229 
c. Lesotho 
Lesotho’s 2004 Children’s Protection and Welfare Bill is one of only 
three anglophone laws currently falling within the “child-centric” category. 
Until quite recently this was a more numerous group, but the cascade of 
new laws and the pressure on nations to upgrade “child-centric” laws to 
“blanket” approaches has diminished the group. The full title of Lesotho’s 
2004 Act was a law, “to consolidate and reform the laws relating to the 
protection and welfare of children and to provide for incidental matters.”230 
While the law incorporates concrete language criminalizing child 
trafficking, its stated objective is “to extend, promote and protect the rights 
of children as defined in the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and 
other international instruments, protocols, standards and rules on the 
protection and welfare of children to which Lesotho is signatory.”231 The 
definition of child trafficking is consistent with the Palermo Protocol as it 
pertains to children.232 
Uniquely, Lesotho’s child trafficking prohibition is preceded by a 
prohibition on exploitative child labor.233 Lesotho’s law criminalizing child 
trafficking is framed more generally than the laws of Togo and Benin, 
insofar as Article 22(n) identifies as a responsibility of the state to “make 
every effort to prevent the sale, trafficking, and abduction of children.” The 
State’s responsibility notwithstanding, Lesotho describes child trafficking in 
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much broader terms than that in any other child-centric law current or 
superseded. Child trafficking is collapsed with child abduction, but the acts 
and punishment referenced by the, “unlawful transfer of possession, custody 
or control of child”234 are several: 
1. Any person who takes part in any transaction the object or one 
of the objects of which is to transfer or confer, wholly or partly, 
temporarily or permanently, the possession, custody or control 
of a child for any valuable consideration, commits an offence 
and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not 
less than twenty years; 
2. Any person who without lawful authority or excuse harbours or 
has in his/her possession, custody or control a child with respect 
to whom the temporary or permanent possession, custody or 
control has been transferred or conferred for valuable 
consideration by any person within or outside Lesotho, commits 
an offence and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for 
a term not less than twenty years; 
3. For the purposes of subsection (2), if any person harbours or has 
in his/her possession, custody or control a child without lawful 
authority or excuse, the child shall, until the contrary is proved, 
be presumed to be a child with respect to whom the temporary 
or permanent possession, custody or control has been transferred 
or conferred for valuable consideration.235 
Though the above definition of trafficking includes the transference of 
children, a subsequent Article provides a unique subcategory of crime—
namely “trafficking of child by false pretences.”236 Here, fraud, deceit, and 
false pretense provide exacerbating circumstances and additional prison 
time not present in other “child-centric” laws.237 The origin of this distinct 
subcategory is unclear, but it appears to be derived from a set of 
overlapping concerns originating with child abduction and extended to 
include trafficking. Lesotho’s law is thus emblematic of the group of states 
prohibiting child trafficking within the context of much broader child 
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protection laws. Lesotho’s law attempts to regulate parental involvement in 
child trafficking, but also provides for a defense.238 
3. Revalidation 
The third legislative model, one of “revalidation,” is predicated on the 
idea that existing laws provide adequate infrastructure for a remedy. This 
means that the relevant criminal codes, labor laws, or employment laws 
need only be revised and updated to incorporate changing circumstances. 
No one state’s laws are emblematic of this model because this group 
consists of states that appear to contend that domestic laws adequately 
provide for the prosecution of traffickers. The “revalidation” group of 
nations is small and continues to diminish in membership. For example, 
Côte d’Ivoire’s penal code imposes imprisonment and fines for the 
following prohibited acts: forced labor,239 entering into contracts that deny 
freedom to a third person,240 and recruiting or offering children for 
prostitution.241 Additionally, the military code prohibits child 
conscription,242 and Mali has similar, if not identical, articles of prohibition 
in the 1973 revision of its criminal code.243 
This “revalidation” group is small, and its membership is rapidly shifting 
as the legislative trend is increasingly used across the continent. For 
example, Rwanda uses existing penal and labor code statutes to prosecute 
traffickers variously for slavery, forced labor, forced prostitution, and child 
prostitution. However, a recent law has criminalized trafficking explicitly, 
and upon implementation Rwanda will move to the “blanket” group. 
Similarly, until December 2009 Kenya was previously a party, but with the 
passage of the Counter-Trafficking in Persons Bill of 2010, it too moved 
into the “blanket” group. Until 2009, Malawi prosecuted traffickers through 
its Employment Act and its Penal Code. But with the recent passage of its 
Child Care, Protection and Justice Act, Malawi has moved into the “child-
centric” category. 
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The revalidation category contains states with complex political conflicts 
and quixotic legislative tendencies, including countries torn apart by civil 
war, all with backlogged and stalled anti-trafficking legislation. For 
example, although Côte d’Ivoire has not passed a domestic anti-trafficking 
law, it has entered into a bilateral child trafficking treaty with neighboring 
Mali.244 Furthermore, the 2009 TIP report observed, “increased efforts to 
address trafficking through . . . enforcement” of existing law, and noted that 
legislation pending would, if passed by the national assembly and signed 
into law, propel it out of the “revalidation group.”245 
The revalidation group contains a number of states whose legislative 
vehicles are either anchored in former colonial rule, or actually consist of 
the vestiges of colonial law. But the fact that colonial laws feature 
prominently and continue to be enforced underscores that this third 
revalidation group is active with regard to anti-trafficking. For example, 
Guinea Bissau currently only criminalizes forced labor under Article 37 of 
its colonial Penal Code, but it recently began drafting a child trafficking 
bill. This shows that these countries are not legislatively moribund or close 
to failure. Instead, while each country in the third group reported 
investigations and prosecutions to the USDOS, many states continue to 
revise their statutes. Other countries, such as Niger, have recently 
revitalized existing laws. For example, Niger’s penal code prohibits 
procurement of a child for prostitution and slavery via a 2003 amendment, 
and forced and compulsory labor through its Labor Code.246 
IV. THE FUTURE OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING ENFORCEMENT AND THE 
NEO-ABOLITIONIST TREND 
By 2010, the legislatures of the supermajority of African republics 
promulgated new legislation to combat and outlaw trafficking in either 
“humans” or “children.”247 These individual laws were the culmination of 
years of research and lobbying by domestic and international anti-
trafficking constituencies, including children’s and women’s advocates, 
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legislators and legal activists, and a decade-long campaign. These laws 
focused on children, domestic violence, and women’s rights by 
criminalizing specific practices associated with the illegal labor and 
movement of individuals, and by penalizing noncompliance in a variety of 
ways.248 The laws provide specific articles to discourage offenders and 
inducements to incentivize compliance. 
The process of drafting laws is consultative and deliberative and draws 
on different sources within a nation and beyond for how to deal legislatively 
with specific issues. While laws are the products of each individual nation, 
the simultaneous introduction of anti-trafficking legislation in multiple 
African national assemblies was not coincidental. Anti-trafficking laws 
unfolded swiftly across Africa in the new millennium, but it would be far 
too simplistic to interpret this development as yet another manifestation of 
US imperialism. While the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) routinely sponsors legislative drafting training in Africa and 
disseminates draft anti-trafficking statutes to national legislative drafters, 
African nations drew on a rich history and a variety of sources for 
inspiration. 
Evidence for a stampede to new law is abundant, but it would be a gross 
mischaracterization to see the avalanche of legislative remedies as without 
precedent. When viewed from a distance, it is apparent that sub-Saharan 
Africa is experiencing only the latest legislative trend in a series of 
historical trends of abolition. An analysis of the contemporary neo-
abolitionist trend reveals three categories of legislative responses to 
trafficking. By identifying the current trend as only the most recent iteration 
of a long-standing tradition, predictions about the future of anti-trafficking 
in the region can be made. 
654 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND ITS VICTIMS 
A.  Five Predictions About the Efficacy of the Current Neo-Abolitionist 
Trend 
First, although on the surface nations appear to be acting independently 
and responding on a domestic basis to the challenges presented by 
trafficking—and not by means of a continental coordinated effort—the 
variation among the responses is minimal. Our analysis identifies only three 
types of state responses to the perception that trafficking is a new and/or 
growing problem. These three categories of legislative remedy are 
identifiable by their respective definitions of trafficking and their stated 
objectives. Members of the “blanket” group are attempting to ban all forms 
of trafficking and deploy the most expansive definitions. The “child-
centric” group is concerned exclusively with criminalizing child trafficking. 
And the “revalidation” group appears to hold the view that there is no 
legitimate basis for new law because existing law provides adequate 
protection. 
Second, notwithstanding the fact that state and nonstate actors repeatedly 
reinforce the notion that trafficking is a new and growing problem, African 
national responses to trafficking are remarkably consistent and predictable. 
Where nations respond domestically with the passage of new laws, the 
description of the problem and the imagined remedy are very similar. This 
suggests the distinct possibility that although national legislatures take their 
responsibility to address the issue seriously, they are simultaneously—
possibly unwittingly—acknowledging that a regional or transnational 
response may be more appropriate, if not more effective. 
Third, historical analysis of the legislative trend and our taxonomy of 
anti-trafficking legislation together suggest that the volatility in the group 
membership in the current neo-abolitionist trend is part of a larger historical 
process. The fluidity between the three groups suggests that, just as all 
participating nations eventually abolished the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 
the nineteenth century, over time all African nations will adopt the 
“blanket” approach. 
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While it is beyond the scope of this article to explore precisely why any 
particular nation may abandon its commitment to either a “child-centric” or 
“revalidation” model, there is circumstantial evidence that suggests some 
early laws were the product of hasty action. For example, with respect to the 
blanket approach, almost immediately upon passage of the new human 
trafficking law, both Ghana and Nigeria began drafting amendments. 
Prosecutors complained that poorly written definitions did not provide the 
leverage to guarantee convictions. For its part, the “child-centric” approach 
is a highly transitory stage. As soon as prosecutors in Burkina Faso, South 
Africa, and Gambia become familiar with the first law, the legislators 
redefined trafficking to include adults. Similarly, the basis for the third 
“revalidation” group underscores its inherent instability and mutability. It 
comprises states with a Janus-faced legislative policy: they simultaneously 
insist that their current domestic legal apparatus is satisfactory, while also 
promulgating revisions of criminal codes, labor laws, and employment 
laws, or entirely new, sweeping anti-trafficking laws. 
Finally, we predict that the relative stability (or instability) of the three 
taxonomies may be tied to how each grapples with a core problem present 
in all states. There are a number of core or common issues, and by 
exploring how different laws in each of the three taxonomies grapple with 
the criminalization of the same core or common issues, the third prediction 
above (that the blanket law is an inevitable outcome throughout Africa), 
may be tested. 
One such common issue is parental consent and coercion. In a subsequent 
article we propose to examine specific legal provisions for parental consent 
and coercion. Because the issue of parental involvement is central to 
contemporary state and nonstate interest in child trafficking, an analysis of 
the relative enforceability of specific statutes as they pertain to parental 
consent and coercion will speak directly to the stability of the taxonomy 
that is unfolding. If parental consent and coercion are adequately described 
and the respective laws are enforceable, the three-part taxonomy will 
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continue to exist. Alternatively, if the respective articles are found to be 
weak and/or unenforceable, African nations will continue to promulgate 
more expansive anti-trafficking legislation and thus further inform this 
preliminary taxonomy. 
B.  Testing the Stability of the Preliminary Anti-Trafficking Taxonomy: 
Parental Consent and Coercion 
The centrality of parental consent and coercion in evolving legislative 
responses to trafficking is becoming increasingly clear to legislators and 
social justice activists alike.249 We have observed that it already features in 
some new laws, including those of Ghana, South Africa, Benin, and 
Lesotho. Because parental consent and coercion are common concerns 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa, it may provide a clue to the stability of the 
emerging taxonomy. The following victim interview is offered to illustrate 
further research direction with regard to the core criminal issues in child 
trafficking. 
The April 2003 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, “Togo: Borderline 
Slavery,” contained an unusual juxtaposition of interviews between a 
trafficking victim and several anti-trafficking practitioners from Togo. Ten-
year-old Kéméyao A. made the following statement: 
There was a woman who came to the market to buy charcoal. She 
found me and told my mother about a woman in Lomé who was 
looking for a girl like me to stay with her and do domestic work. 
She came to my mother, and my mother gave me away. The 
woman gave my mother some money, but I don’t know how 
much.250 
Kéméyao identified a direct relationship of complicity between the 
trafficking agent and her mother. However, among Togo’s anti-trafficking 
activists, attitudes differ on how to address parental responsibility.251 
Over the objections of the committee’s president, Judge Emanuel Edorh, 
the drafting committee of Togo’s Children’s Code included expansive 
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criminalization of parental roles in the draft legislation. Edorh told HRW 
that while nearly everyone on the committee, including NGO members, 
wanted to strongly penalize parents who contributed to the trafficking of 
children, he disagreed: 
[I]t does not further the rights of the child to violate human rights 
[of parents] in this way. . . . If a father takes a risk with his child, 
we know he’s committed an infraction and has to be punished. But 
where I part with my fellow committee members is whether such a 
parent should be imprisoned for six years. The punishment should 
be six months to a year, not six years.252 
Judge Edorh’s view was shared by Togo’s Minister of Women’s Affairs, 
Suzanne Aho. She expressed concern about how the “punishment of parents 
. . . might affect children.”253 She explained that “children are also 
stigmatized when they have a parent in prison.”254 
Although many Togolese anti-trafficking activists and NGOs supported 
strong penalties for parents, HRW failed to support these goals and 
endorsed only limited provisions on parental complicity. HRW couched its 
position in the language of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child, 
which states that the “best interests of the child” should guide 
policymakers.255 HRW called for, “an explicit defense for parents who are 
genuinely deceived about the purpose of their child’s recruitment, believing 
it to be educational or otherwise non-exploitative.”256 HRW further 
endorsed, “reduced penalties for parents who reasonably but mistakenly 
believe that aiding and abetting child trafficking, or failing to report child 
traffickers to the police, is in their child’s best interests.”257 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the preliminary nature of this analysis allows us only to lay the 
groundwork for further study, we do not yet offer policy proposals to the 
myriad of problems raised in this article. However, we suggest that certain 
common difficulties faced by sub-Saharan nations grappling with domestic 
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and cross-border trafficking can be ameliorated. This would require states to 
expand data-gathering operations, increase capacity in internal 
investigations and prosecutions, and institute regular region-wide agency 
cooperation procedures. 
A. Resolving Lack of Implementation 
As in the case of Mauritania, numerous sub-Saharan nations have passed 
anti-trafficking laws that have not been implemented. This defeats anti-
trafficking efforts, because the impetus to establish social change generally 
dissipates after the passage because activists assume that the goal has been 
reached. The laws thus serve to cap investigation of the very problem they 
purport to solve. 
Any solution to this lack of implementation would require increased data-
gathering on the incidence and nature of local forms of trafficking and on 
the status of investigations and prosecutions under the law. Relevant 
ministries should be directed to detail the steps taken to implement the 
nation’s anti-trafficking law and should submit such reports at least 
annually to the nation’s legislature to allow for longitudinal study of the 
law’s effectiveness. 
Effective implementation would also require the relevant ministries to 
build a corps of investigators trained in interviewing victims and gathering 
evidence and a similar corps of lawyers capable of presenting such evidence 
to the courts. Because these prosecutions often require the development of 
evidence less tangible than is the norm in more common crimes (such as 
property, theft, or murder), professionalizing and training these officials 
becomes imperative if anti-trafficking laws are to have any impact at all. 
B. Resolving Lack of Cross-Border Cooperation 
Increased data-gathering would further serve as a basic tool in building 
connections between nations’ anti-trafficking agencies. As we have 
observed above, the paucity of regional and cross-border information on 
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trafficking hampers any rigorous analysis of these crimes. Also, the intra-
country focus of existing data prevents standardization and open 
communication between nations, creating obstacles to regional cooperation 
in enforcement. 
Beyond the removal of communication barriers, a solution to the lack of 
cooperation between sub-Saharan nations requires the permanent institution 
of data-sharing and the establishment of regular conferencing at the 
investigative level. We note that many of the laws described herein require 
interaction between nations at the ministerial level, perhaps to signify the 
importance of the laws. However, the resulting intermittent high-level 
meetings cannot fulfill the need for regular communication that is the 
cornerstone of any cooperative effort. 
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Appadurai, Is Homo Hierarchicus?, 13  AM. ETHNOLOGIST 745 (1986). 
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105 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others, League of Nations, Dec. 2, 1949, available at 
http://www.uncjin.org/Standards/Compendium/pt1i.pdf. 
106 See, e.g., J.P. Daughton, Behind the Imperial Curtain: International Humanitarian 
Efforts and the Critique of French Colonialism in the Interwar Years, 34 FRENCH HIST. 
STUD. (forthcoming 2011). On the debate over eighteenth and nineteenth 
humanitarianism, see Thomas L. Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of the 
Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 1, in THE ANTISLAVERY DEBATE: CAPITALISM AND 
ABOLITIONISM AS A PROBLEM OF HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 107–35 (Thomas 
Bender ed., 1992). 
107 The text of The General Act of the Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference specifically 
requires signing parties to monitor and report on a national basis. See Brussels Anti-
Slavery Conference, July 2, 1890, 27 Stat. 886; T.S. 383.  
108 See Report Presented by the Temp. Slavery Comm., League of Nations Doc. 
C.465.1925.VI (1925). 
109 See Nina Lassen, Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices: United Nations Standards and 
Implementation,” 57 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 197, 198–99 (1988); Kathryn Zoglin, United 
Nations Action Against Slavery: A Critical Evaluation, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 306, 308–10 
(1986). 
110 See Frederick Cooper, From Free Labor to Family Allowances: Labor and African 
Society in Colonial Discourse, 16 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 745, 749–52 (1989). 
111 See Convention (ILO No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour art. 2, June 
28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (1930), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/convde 
convde.pl?C029. 
112 See SUZANNE MIERS, SLAVERY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE EVOLUTION OF A 
GLOBAL PATTERN 48 (2003); Kevin Bales & Peter T. Robbins, “No One Shall be Held in 
Slavery or Servitudes”: A Critical Analysis of International Slavery Agreements and 
Concepts of Slavery, 2 HUM. RTS. REV. 18, 22 (2001), 
113 See Vos supra note 85. 
114 See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of 
Full Age, Oct. 11, 1933, 150 L.N.T.S. 431. 
115 See Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation 
of the Prostitution of Others, pmbl., Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T. 271 (“prostitution and the 
accompanying evil of the traffic in persons for the purpose of prostitution are 
incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person and endanger the welfare of 
the individual, the family and the community”). 
116 The term “unfreedom” has generally been used to describe the status of proletarians 
and similar labor forces whose capacity to change their condition (to paraphrase Marx), 
paralleled the experience of slaves. See, e.g., G. A. Cohen, The Structure of Proletarian 
Unfreedom, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 5 (1983). Increasingly, the term unfreedom has 
entered scholarly descriptions of postabolition societies, in order to account for new 
forms of bondage emerging in the wake of abolition. For an early example, see R. Frucht, 
From Slavery to Unfreedom in the Planation Society of St. Kitts, W.I., 292 ANNALS N.Y. 
ACAD. SCI. 379 (1977). See also William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery 
in British North America, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711 (1996). 
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117 See Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 266226 U.N.T. 40, available 
at http://www.wwda.org.au/slavabol1.pdf3. 
118 See id. at art. 1. 
119 See id. at art. 13 sec. 2 (entering into force upon ratification or accession of the State). 
120 CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
188–89 (1994); MIERS, supra note 112, at 327. 
121 But a key distinction emerges with respect to antislavery and anti-trafficking 
legislation, as opposed to other themes or topics. We have identified a sequence of trends 
over several centuries, of which, the contemporary is only the latest iteration. The 
unveiling of the multiple trends of anti-slavery and abolition legislation—vividly 
displayed in the previous vertical narrative of Mauritanian attempts to extinguish slavery 
—suggests that there is something particular about slavery’s capacity to withstand and 
evade repeated attempts at legislative remedy. Perhaps the apparent necessity for repeated 
broad, regional, and international attempts to eradicate slavery and trafficking is also 
worthy of consideration. 
122 See George GB. Tindall, Mythology: A New Frontier in Southern History, in THE 
IDEA OF THE SOUTH: PURSUIT OF A CENTRAL THEME 5–6 (Frank E. Vandiver ed., 1964). 
See also, HOWARD; H ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS (1965–1964); THE 
ANTISLAVERY VANGUARD: NEW ESSAYS ON THE ABOLITIONISTS (Martin Duberman ed., 
1965); L. Perry, Psychology and the Abolitionists: Reflections on Martin Duberman and 
the Neoabolitionism of the 1960s, 2 REV. AM. HIST. 309 (1974). 
123 See L. Billington D, Review, Tilden G. Edelstein, Strange Enthusiasm: A Life of 
Thomas Wentworth Higginson, 5 J. AM. STUD. 207 (1971); AILEEN S. KRADITOR, 
MEANS AND ENDS IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM: GARRISON AND HIS CRITICS ON 
STRATEGY AND TACTICS, 1834–1850 (1969); JAMES MCPHERSON, THE ABOLITIONIST 
LEGACY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NAACP (1975); ANTISLAVERY 
RECONSIDERED (Michael Fellman and Lewis Perry eds., 1979); D. BLIGHT, RACE AND 
REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY (2001); PROPHETS OF PROTEST: 
RECONSIDERING THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM (Timothy McCarthy & 
John Stauffer eds., 2006). 
124 Just as Civil Rights advocates believed in the fundamental change effected by federal 
legislative and judicial action, today’s neo-abolitionists focus their advocacy on new anti-
trafficking laws. And just as Frederick Douglass, W. E. B. du Bois, and others held the 
Southern slave states’ desire to preserve the institution of slavery to be the primary cause 
of the Civil War, and that the nation had a moral obligation to abolish slavery and realize 
equal rights for all, neo-abolitionism harnesses the moral outrage erupting after each new 
exposé of the continued presence of child slaves and child enslavement networks. The 
contemporary neo-abolitionists embrace macro trends and transnational analysis and 
employ a discourse of “crisis” to amplify the “urgency” of action. Most importantly, 
however, like the nineteenth-century abolitionists, today’s neo-abolitionists establish 
close and effective relationships with media outlets. They prioritize the control of the 
form and content of their message represents a striking departure from the broader child 
labor advocacy of the 1980s and 1990s. For further discussion, see Benjamin N. 
Lawrance, Documenting Child Slavery with Personal Testimony: The Origins of Anti-
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Trafficking NGOs and Contemporary Neo-Abolitionism, in TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN 
AND CHILDREN IN AFRICA, supra note 77.  
125 The nations that have no new legislation pertaining to trafficking since 2001 or for 
which no data is available are Cape Verde, Eritrea, Somalia, Seychelles, Sao Tome e 
Principe, and Zimbabwe. See UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (2009), http://www.unodc.org/documents/humantrafficking/Gl 
obal_Report_on_TIP.pdf. 
126 This data includes all references to draft bills, tabled bills and laws, and revisions of 
existing codes pertaining to trafficking or use in the enforcement of anti-trafficking 
initiatives. In some instances countries may have drafted, tabled, or passed multiple bills 
or laws and enacted multiple code revisions. 
127 See generally US DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (1st ed. 2001); 
2002 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 2; 2003 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
REPORT, supra note 56; 2004 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2005 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2006 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
REPORT, supra note 5; 2007 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2008 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
REPORT, supra note 3; 2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21. 
128 See CODE PÉNAL [PENAL CODE] (Côte d’Ivoire), available at http://www.protection 
project.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/IVORY-COAST-FRENCH1.pdf.  
129 Employment Act of 2000, § 4(1)–(2) (Act. No. 6/2000) (Malawi). 
130 2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21 at 222 ( “Malawi prohibits all 
forms of trafficking through various laws, including the Employment Act and Articles 
135 through 147 and 257 through 269 of the Penal Code, though the country lacks 
specific anti-trafficking laws.”). 
131 The Labour Proclamation of Eritrea, (No. 118/2001), tit. I art. 3(17)(b) (Eritrea). 
132 See id. at tit. III art. 9(6) (“An employer who engages in forced labour shall be 
punishable under the Penal Code.”).” 
133 2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21, at 142.  
134 2002 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. 
135 République du Mali, Code pénal de la République du Mali (Art. 242 of 1973) 
136 Id. at art 244. 
137 2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21, at 227. 
138 Id. at 228 (“the Malian government decided to introduce a law criminalizing all forms 
of trafficking in 2010.”). 
139 Loi No. 38/2003 du 27 mai 2003 Portant Définition et repression du traffic d’enfant(s) 
[Law No. 28/2003 of May 27, 2003 On the Definition and Suppression of Child 
Trafficking] c. I, art. 2 (Burk. Faso), available at http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/BURKINA-FASO.pdf. 
140 Id. at c. I, art. 3 (“Article 3: Est réputé trafic d’enfant(s) tout acte par lequel un enfant 
est recruté, transporté, transféré, hébergé ou accueilli, à l’intérieur ou à l’extérieur du 
territoire burkinabè par un ou plusieurs trafiquants au moyen de menaces et 
d’intimidation par la force ou d’autres formes de contraintes, de détournements, de 
fraudes ou supercheries, d’abus de pouvoir ou d’exploitation de la situation de 
vulnérabilité d’un enfant ou dans le cas d’offre ou de réception de rémunération en vue 
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d’obtenir le consentement d’une personne ayant pouvoir de contrôle sur lui à des fins 
d’exploitation économique, sexuelle, d’adoption illicite, d’union matrimoniale précoce ou 
forcée ou à toute autre fin préjudiciable à la santé, au développement physique, mental et 
au bien-être de l’enfant.”) 
141 See id. at c. II, art. 4. 
142 Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act Cap. 
(24) § 50 (Nigeria). The Act defines key terms: 
“Trafficking” includes all acts and attempted acts involved in the recruitment, 
transportation within or across Nigerian borders, purchases, sale, transfer, 
receipt or harbouring of a person involving the use of deception, coercion or 
debt bondage for the purpose of placing or holding the person whether for or 
not in involuntary servitude (domestic, sexual or reproductive) in force or 
bonded labour, or in slavery-like conditions; 
“Trafficked persons” means a victim of trafficking in persons; “Trafficker” 
means a person or an entity that intends to commit, aids, abets or acquiesces to 
an act of trafficking in persons. Id. 
143 Id. at Art. 23. 
144 See 2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21, at 254 (“Niger prohibits 
slavery through a 2003 amendment to Article 270 of its penal code and prohibits forced 
and compulsory labor through Article 4 of its labor code. Penal code Articles 292 and 
293 prohibit procurement of a child for prostitution, and Article 181 prohibits 
encouraging child begging or profiting from child begging.”). 
145 See Prevention of Organised Crime Act, (Act No. 29/2004) ch. 1 (Namib.), available 
at http://www.parliament.gov.na/acts_documents/228_act_29_of_2004.pdfRepublic. 
146 See id. (“‘trafficking in persons’ means the recruitment, transfer, harbouring or receipt 
of persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation and includes any attempt, 
participation or organising of any of these actions. Exploitation includes, at a minimum, 
the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs . . . .”). 
147 Children’s Protection and Welfare Act 2004 §2 (Lesotho), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/afs/lesotho/les_ch_welfare_bill.htm.  
148 Loi N° 009/2004 relative à la prévention et à la lutte contre le trafic des enfants en 
République Gabonaise (rapport n° 13/2004 - Sénat) [Act No. 009/2004 on preventing 
and fighting against child trafficking in Gabon (Report No. 13/2004 - Senate)].  
149 See CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 597 (Eth.), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex 
/docs/ELECTRONIC/70993/75092/F1429731028/ETH70993.pdf . 
150 See 2006 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5, at 47. 
151 Anti-Human Trafficking Act (Act No. 7/2005) § 2(2) (Sierra Leone) (“A person 
engages in the trafficking in persons if he undertakes the recruitment, transportation, 
A "Neo-Abolitionist Trend" in Sub-Saharan Africa? 673 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 2 • 2011 
 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a 
position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve 
the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of 
exploitation.). 
152 Act to Ban Trafficking in Persons within the Republic of Liberia of 2005 §100, 
available at http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Liberia_Act-
to-BanTIP_2005.pdf (“‘Trafficking In Persons’ shall mean the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a person by means of the threat or use of 
force or other means of coercion, or by abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of 
a position of vulnerability, or by the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation.”). 
153 See generally 2006 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2007 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2008 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
REPORT, supra note 5; 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3; 2010 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21. 
154 See Loi 210/AN/07/5ème du 2 octobre 2007 relative à la Lutte Contre le Trafic des 
Êtres Humains [Law 210/AN/-7/5 of Oct. 2, 2007 On Combating Trafficking in Human 
Beings] (Djib.), available at http://www.presidence.dj/jo/2007/loi210an07.php; Lei No. 
6/2008 de 9 de Julho 2008 [Law No. 6/2008 of July 9, 2008] (Mozam.); The Counter-
Trafficking in Persons Act (Act No. 52/2010) (Kenya) 
155 See generally 2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21.  
156 See Loi No. 029-2008/AN du 15 mai 2000 du Portant Lutte Contre La Traite Des 
Personnes Et Les Pratiques Assimilees; [Law No. 029-2008/AN of May 15, 2000 On the 
Fight Against Trafficking in Persons and Related Practices] (Burk. Faso), available at 
http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/BURKINA-FASO.pdf; 
Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, (Bill No. 7/2010) (S. Afr.); The 
Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act (Act No. 2/2009) (Mauritius), available at 
https://www.oit.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents 
/legaldocument/wcms_126787.pdf; Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law 
Enforcement and Administration Act Cap. (24) § 50 (Nigeria). See also, 2009 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 226 (Nigeria’s “2003 Trafficking in 
Persons Law Enforcement and Administration Act . . . was amended in 2005 to increase 
penalties for traffickers.”). 
157 See Human Trafficking (Amendment) Bill (GPC/A464/350/9/2007) (Ghana); DANISH 
IMMIGRATION SERV., PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING IN GHANA 8 (2008), 
available at http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/EB5BAEDA-0D96-46C2-B2D2-
E48BA8911B2C/0/Ghanaffrapport2008.pdf (“The Attorney-General’s Department 
explained that during the passage of Act 694 the words ‘for the purpose of exploitation’ 
were mistakenly left out. The effect of this omission was that the definition of human 
trafficking was not in accord with the internationally agreed definition of human 
trafficking in the Palermo Protocol.”). See also Benjamin N. Lawrance, From Child 
Labor “Problem”‘Problem’ to Human Trafficking “Crisis”‘Crisis’: Child Advocacy and 
Anti-Trafficking Legislation in Ghana, 78 INT’L LAB. 63 (2010). 
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158 For organ theft, see Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, (Bill 
No. 7/2010) art. 3.1(a) (S. Afr.) and Human Trafficking (Amendment) Bill 
(GPC/A464/350/9/2007) art. 1.2 (Ghana). 
159 See 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 226 
160 Id. at 226–27. 
161 Human Trafficking Act of 2005 (GPC/A464/350/9/2007), art.); Article 1(1)(a)–)(b) 
(Ghana), available at http://www.mowacghana.net/download/Human%20Trafficking 
%20Act.pdf. 
162 Id. at art. (2). 
163 See id. at art. 1(3). 
164 See id. at art. 2(1). 
165 See id. at art. 2(2). 
166 Id. at art. 3(1). 
167 Id. at art. 2. 
168 Id. at art. 2(3). 
169 Id. at art. 2(4). 
170 Id. at art. 4. 
171 Id. at art. 8 (“A person is liable to be tried and punished in Ghana for trafficking if the 
person does an act which if done within the jurisdiction of the courts in this country 
would have constituted the offence of trafficking.”). 
172 Id. at art. 7 (“Special Mitigating Factors”). 
173 Id. at art. 6(1)(a). 
174 Id. at art. 9(1)(a)–(d). 
175 See id. at art. 9(2)–(5). 
176 Id. at art. 6(2)(b)(i)–(iv) (defining “Organisation” in Article 42). 
177 Id. at art. 14–17. 
178 Id. at art. 17(2); art.18(4). 
179 See id. at art. 35; Human Trafficking (Amendment) Act of 2006 (Ghana). 
180 See Lei No. 6/2008 de 9 de Julho 2008 de Tráfico de pessoas Artigo 10 [Law No. 
6/2008 of July 9, 2008 de Trafficking in Persons art. 10] (Mozam.) (“Todo aquele que 
recrutar, transportar, acolher, fornecer ou receber uma pessoa, pour quaisquer meios, 
incluindo sob pretexto de emprego doméstico ou no estrangeiro ou formação ou 
aprendizagem, para fins de prostituição, trabalho forcado, escravatura, servidão 
involuntária ou servidão por dívida será punido….”). The definition of “trafficking in 
persons” appears in the glossary annex. See id. at Anexo [Annex]. 
181 Id. at art. 16. 
182 Id. at art. 5(b). 
183 See Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, (Bill No. 7/2010) (S. 
Afr.). The full title of the draft bill is:  
To give effect to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000; to 
provide for an offence of trafficking in persons and other offences associated 
with trafficking in persons; to prevent and combat the trafficking in persons 
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within or across the borders of the Republic; to provide for measures to protect 
and assist victims of trafficking in persons; to provide for the establishment of 
the Intersectoral Committee on Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in 
Persons; and to provide for matters connected therewith. Id. 
184 Ghana’s law does not cite the Palermo Protocol. In contrast, South Africa’s draft bill 
includes the full protocol in Schedule 2 and, under the Chapter 1 definitions. Id. at § 1(1), 
sched. 2 (“‘UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons’ means 
the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 60 Persons, 
especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime, 2000, the English text of which is replicated in Schedule 
2.”). 
185 Id. at pmbl. (“MINDFUL of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000, and other 
international instruments which place obligations on the Republic of South Africa 
towards the combating and, ultimately, the eradication of trafficking in persons…”). 
Ghana’s law contains no such preamble or reference to obligations. 
186 Id. at § 34(1).  
187 Id. at § 34(34). 
188 See 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. 
189 Compare see Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, (Bill No. 
7/2010) § 34 (S. Afr.) (“Trafficking of child by parent, guardian or other person who has 
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of child”) and Children’s Act, (Act No. 38, 
2005) cl. 287 (S. Afr.) (“[Clause] 287. If a court has reason to believe that the parent or 
guardian of a child or any other person who has parental responsibilities and rights in 
respect of a child, has trafficked the child or allowed the child to be trafficked, the court 
may—(a) suspend all parental responsibilities and rights of that parent, guardian, or other 
person; and (b) place that child in temporary safe care, pending an inquiry by a children’s 
court.”) available at http://www.education.gov.za/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=XMF%2Fuq 
Nr52U%3D&tabid=271&mid=1140. 
190 See Loi N° 009/2004 relative à la prévention et à la lutte contre le trafic des enfants en 
République Gabonaise (rapport n° 13/2004 - Sénat) [Act No. 009/2004 on preventing 
and fighting against child trafficking in Gabon (Report No. 13/2004 - Senate)] (Gabon); 
Relating to the Fight against Child Trafficking and Slavery (Law No. 015/2005) 
(Cameroon). See also 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 97–98, 
137–38); A 2006 Cameroonian draft bill on human trafficking has not been signed into 
law. See 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 98. 
191 See, e.g., Loi No. 38/2003 du 27 mai 2003 Portant Définition et repression du traffic 
d’enfant(s) [Law No. 28/2003 of May 27, 2003 On the Definition and Suppression of 
Child Trafficking] c. I, art. 2 (Burk. Faso) . This group also includes Southern Sudan, a 
region soon to become independent, and already passing it own legislation. 
192 Loi No.2005-009 Relative au Trafic D’enfants au Togo Chapîtres I–V [Law No. 2005-
09 Relating to Child Trafficking in Togo ch. I–V] (Togo), available at 
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193 The full law comprises three printed pages, in contrast with, for example, Zambia’s 
fifty-four page human trafficking law. 
194 Loi No.2005-009 Relative au Trafic D’enfants au Togo Chapître I Article prémier 
[Law No. 2005-09 Relating to Child Trafficking in Togo ch. I art. 1] (Togo). 
195 Id. at ch. II art. 2. 
196 Id. at ch. II art. 3. 
197 Id. at ch. II art. 4. 
198 Id. at ch. II art. 5. 
199 Id. at ch. II art. 6. 
200 See id. at ch. III art. 7 (“L’Etat et les collectivités locales prennent toutes les mésures 
appropriées en vue d’assurer la protection de tous les enfants contre le trafic et toute 
forme d’exploitation.”). 
201 Id. at ch. III art. 9 
202 Id.  
203 Id. at ch. III art. 10. 
204 Id. at ch. III art. 11. 
205 See id. at ch. III. art. 12. 
206 Loi No.2006-04 Du 10 AVRIL 2006, Chapter 1, Article 1. It builds on a 1961 law 
concerning the movement on minors outside the nation and a 1973 modification of the 
criminal code with respect to the slavery and the abduction of minors. Loi No.61-20 du 
05 Juillet 1961 (République du Dahomey); Ordonnance No.73-37 du 13 Avril 1973. It 
builds on a 1961 law concerning the movement on minors outside the nation and a 1973 
modification of the criminal code with respect to the slavery and the abduction of minors. 
207 See Loi No. 2006-04 Du 05 Avril 2006 de Portant conditions de deplacement des 
mineurs et repression de la traite d’ enfants en republique de benin, Chapître Premier 
Article 2 [Law No. 2006-04 of Apr. 5, 2006 on the Condition of Juvenile Movement and 
Repression of Child Trafficking in the Republic of Benin ch. I art. 2] (Benin). 
208 Id. at ch. I art. 2. 
209 Id. at ch. I art. 3. 
210 Id. at ch. I art. 4. 
211 See id. at ch. 1 art. 5–6. 
212 Id. at ch. I art. 7. 
213 Id. at ch. 1 art. 7. 
214 The mode of acquisition of such authorization is to be elaborated by decree by the 
Council of Ministers. 
215 The law is unclear as to who should be in possession of the documents—the child, the 
parent, the guardian, or all of the above. See Loi No. 2006-04 Du 05 Avril 2006 de 
Portant conditions de deplacement des mineurs et repression de la traite d’ enfants en 
republique de benin, Chapître II Article 9 [Law No. 2006-04 of Apr. 5, 2006 on the 
Condition of Juvenile Movement and Repression of Child Trafficking in the Republic of 
Benin ch. III art. 16] (Benin). Moreover, in the paramount interests of the child, any 
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